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I. INTRODUCTION
It is common knowledge today that the popularity of the motorcycle'
has increased dramatically in the United States. Over a twelve year period
from 1964 to 1976 the number of registered motorcycles in this country
increased over 400 percent. 2 A disheartening but corresponding truism is
that as the popularity of the motorcycle increases, so do motorcycle
fatalities and severe injuries resulting from accidents.3 The United States
Department of Transportation (USDOT) estimates that more than
350,000 motorcyclists are injured annually and, in 1977 alone, over 4,000
motorcyclists were killed.4 There are numerous causes for so many
fatalities and severe injuries. Some of these, such as road conditions and
the negligence of other motorists, are outside a motorcyclist's control.
Other causes, however, such as failing to wear a protective helmet, are
directly within a motorcyclist's control.
Recognizing this problem, many states-beginning with New York in
1966 5-enacted laws requiring the use of helmets by motorcycle operators.
"Momentum" for this approach was provided by the federal Highway
Safety Act,6 under the authority of which the Secretary of Transportation
conditioned the availability of certain federal highway funding on the
existence of state helmet-use statutes. By 1975, all but three states7 had
I. OIIiO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.01(C) (Page Supp. 1978), defines "motorcycle" as:
[E]very motor vehicle, other than a tractor, having a saddle for the use of the operator
and designed to travel on not more than three wheels in contact with the ground, including
but not limited to, motor vehicles known as "motor-driven cycle," "motor scooter," or
"motorcycle" without regard to weight or brake horsepower.
2. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION,
MOTORCYCLE HELMETS: CLAIMS AND FACTS (DOT HS 802 732 January 1978). In 1976, 5,000,000
motorcycles were registered nationwide, compared to 985,000 in 1964. In Ohio, motorcycle
registrations increased from 48,801 in 1964 to 318,103 in 1976. OHIO DEP'T OF HIGHWAY SAFETY,
OHIO'S MANDATORY HELMET USE LAW: ITS EFFECT ON THE FATALITY RATE (1977).
3. During the period 1964 to 1976, the number of motorcycle fatalities, both nationwide and in
Ohio, tripled. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, MOTORCYCLE HELMETS: CLAIMS AND FACTS (DOT HS 802 732January 1978); OHIO
DEP'T OF H IGH WAY SAFETY, OHIO'S MANDATORY HELMET USE LAW: ITS EFFECTON THE FATALITY RATE
(1977).
4. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION,
FACT SHEET: MOTORCYCLE HELMETS-THEY SAVE LIVES AND REDUCE INJURIES. In Ohio therewere 185
motorcycle fatalities in 1977. Interview with John R. Pichler, Systems Evaluation Specialist, Ohio
Dep't of Highway Safety, in Columbus, Ohio (Oct. 2, 1978).
5. 1966 N.Y. Laws ch. 979 (currently codified, as amended, at N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAWS § 381
(McKinney 1970)).
6. Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564, tit. I, 80 Stat. 731.
7. California never enacted a mandatory helmet-use law. Illinois enacted a law in 1969, 1969 Ill.
Laws Pub. Act No. 76-1586, § 11-1404, but that law was declared unconstitutional by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Peoplev. Fries, 42 Il1. 2d446, 250 N.E.2d 149(1969). Utah's helmet law, UTAH CODE
ANN. § 41-6-107.8 (1970), requires helmet use only on roads with a posted speed limit of greater than 35
miles per hour.
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enacted mandatory helmet laws. In 1976, however, the Secretary of
Transportation's authority to pressure enactment of helmet laws was
withdrawn8 and states began to repeal their laws in rapid fashion.9 The
consequent increase in the number of helmetless cyclists on the nation's
highways has led, not surprisingly, to a higher number of motorcycle-
related fatalities and injuries.10 Lawsuits concerning those deaths and
injuries have presented complex legal claims and defenses directed at
imposing legal responsibilities on riders who choose to ride helmetless. It is
with these legal issues that this article is concerned.
The discussion in the article will be presented in the context of a
hypothetical personal injury suit brought by a motorcyclist against a
negligent motorist. The inquiry centers on whether the cyclist's failure to
wear a helmet should constitute a defense that would limit or preclude
entirely his recovery. The hypothetical fact pattern is typical of motorcycle
accident cases:
P, a fairly experienced motorcyclist, decides on a Sunday afternoon to take a
leisurely ride around his community on his motorcycle. He decides not to
wear his protective helmet. As P is riding at the legal rate of speed on Main
Street, D, a fairly experienced motorist, is driving his automobile on Central
Street, approaching the intersection of Main and Central. The intersection is
controlled by a stop sign on Central Street, but D negligently fails to yield to it
and, as a result, collides with P. Upon impact, P is catapulted from his
motorcycle, his head strikes the pavement and he sustains permanent brain
damage as a result. After examination, doctors determine that P's head
injuries were the only substantial injuries sustained, and that had P been
wearing a helmet, the injury to his head would have been substantially less
serious. Later, P brings suit against D, claiming damages for the injuries he
sustained.
The analytical viewpoint of the article is that of defense counsel
representing the negligent motorist, D. Defense counsel should generally
consider three possible theories upon which to posit a "motorcycle helmet
defense." First, that under a contributory negligence theory, P's failure to
wear a helmet was a violation of the jurisdiction's mandatory helmet-use
law and, consequently, constituted contributory negligence per se, or, in
the absence of such a statute, that P's conduct nonetheless constituted
common-law contributory negligence. Second, that P's failure to wear a
helmet constituted an assumption of the risk. Third, under a diminution of
damages theory, that P's failure to wear a helmet substantially contributed
to his injuries and, therefore, precludes his recovering for those damages he
could have mitigated or avoided by wearing a helmet.
Before undertaking this analysis it will be necessary in the first part of the
article to provide a brief explanation of the historical background and
8. Highway Safety Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-280, tit. 11, 90 Stat. 451 (1976). See note 37 and
accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 39-43 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text infra.
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development of the mandatory helmet-use laws. The second part of the
article will present the current case-law status of the "motorcycle helmet
defense" and this writer's view of its future trend. Finally, the article will set
forth and assess the possible theories defense counsel may employ in
establishing the "motorcycle helmet defense," and the extent to which he
might expect to succeed with each.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF HELMET LAWS
A. The "Birth" of Helmet- Use Laws
In 1966, the New York legislature enacted the first mandatory helmet-
use legislation," prohibiting any person from riding a motorcycle without
wearing approved protective headgear.12 In the same year, the United
States Congress passed the Highway Safety Act, 3 which required each
state to implement a highway safety program conforming with standards
to be set by the Secretary of Transportation. The Act also contained
sanction provisions authorizing the Transportation Department to
withhold certain federal highway funds from those states that did not
comply with the Secretary's standards.' 4 In June of 1967, a Highway
Safety Program Standard entitled "Motorcycle Safety" was promulgated
by the Secretary requiring the states to enact mandatory helmet-use laws.15
Prior to 1976, all but three states had substantially complied with the
Standard.' 6 Ohio's mandatory helmet law became effective on January 1,
1968.17
B. Constitutional Attacks
Enactment of the various states' helmet laws was quickly followed by
11. 1966 N.Y. Laws ch. 979 (currently codified, as amended, at N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 381
(McKinney 1970).
12. In the Ohio case of State v. Stouffer, 28 Ohio App. 229, 276 N.E.2d 651 (1971), the court,
construing "protective helmet" as used in Ohio's helmet statute, stated:
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "helmet" as "any of various
protective head coverings usually made of hard material (as metal, heavy leather, fiber) to
resist impact and supported by bands that prevent direct contact with the head for comfort
and ventilation." The soft cap appellant was wearing is not included in that definition.
28 Ohio App. at 231, 276 N.E.2d at 653-54, construing OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.53 (Page 1973).
13. Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-564, tit. I, 80 Stat. 731.
14. Id. § 402(c). The Secretary of Transportation was directed to withhold 100% of a state's
federal highway safety funds and 10% of its highway construction funds if that state did not implement
an approved highway safety program by early 1969. Id.
15. 23 C.F.R. § 1204.4 (1979).
16. See note 7 supra.
17. 1968 Ohio Laws 1642 (codified at OHto REV. CODE § 4511.53 (Page 1973, amended 1978))
provided:
No person shall operate a snowmobile, or a motorcycle on a highway, or be a passenger
on a snowmobile or a motorcycle, unless wearing a protective helmet on his head, with the
chin strap properly fastened, and using safety glasses or other protective eye device. Such
helmet, safety glasses, or other protective eye device shall conform with regulations
prescribed and promulgated by the director of highway safety. The provisions of this
paragraph or a violation thereof shall not be used in the trial of any civil action.
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constitutional challenges. Although a majority of courts have upheld the
laws as being within the purview of the states' police power 8 a minority of
decisions hold otherwise.' 9
The arguments claiming the laws are unconstitutional20 have
generally followed two lines of reasoning. First, it has been argued that the
laws are an improper exercise of a state's police power since they do not
legitimately relate to the health, safety, and welfare of the public but only
to that of an individual motorcyclist (the "ends" argument).2 ' Thus, the
opponents of the laws view the issue as being one of "freedom of choice"
and contend that the legislation is an unwarranted infringement on a
motorcyclist's personal liberty. 2 Second, it has been asserted that the
helmet laws are an unreasonable means of carrying out a state's alleged
purpose (the "means" argument). This attack includes arguments such as
the following: that the laws violate equal protection norms;23 that they are
an infringement on the right to travel;2 4 and that they are unreasonable
25because they are ineffective in remedying any perceived problems.
18. See, e.g., Commonwealthv. Howie, 354 Mass. 769,238 N.E.2d 373 (1968); Statev. Mele, 103
N.J. Super. 353, 247 A.2d 176 (1968); State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 241 A.2d 625 (R.I. 1968);
People v. Schmidt, 54 Misc. 2d702,283 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1967); People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466,282
N.Y.S.2d 797 (1967). See also note 103 and accompanying text supra.
19. See, e.g., Everhardt v. City of New Orleans, 208 So. 2d 423 (La. Ct. App. 1968); American
Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968), rev'd sub nom. City of Adrian
v. Poucher, 398 Mich. 316, 247 N.W.2d 798 (1976); People v. Smallwood, 52 Misc. 2d 1027, 277
N.Y.S.2d 429 (1967), rev'dsub nom. People v. Carmichael, 56 Misc. 2d 388,288 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1968);
State v. Stouffer, 28 Ohio App. 2d 229, 276 N.E.2d 651 (1971); State v. Betts, 21 Ohio Misc. 175,252
N.E.2d 866 (Franklin County Mun. Ct. 1969). See also Note, Motorcycle Helmets and the
Constitutionality of Self-Protective Legislation, 30 OHIo ST. L.J. 355, 355 n.7 (1969).
20. For an excellent discussion concerning the constitutionality of helmet laws, see Note,
Motorcycle Helmets and the Constitutionality of Self-Protective Legislation, 30 OHIo ST L.J. 355
(1969). See also Annot., Validity of Traffic Regulations Requiring Motorcyclists to Wear Protective
Headgear, 32 A.L.R.3d 1270 (1970).
21. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 11 Mich. App. 351, 158 N.W.2d 72 (1968). The
Michigan court said: "This statute has a relationship to the protection of the individual motorcyclist
from himself, but not to the public health, safety and welfare . . . .The precedential consequences of
'stretching our imagination' to find a relationship to the public health, safety and welfare, require the
invalidation of this statute." Id. at 355, 158 N.W. 2d at 76-77. In People v. Carmichael, 53 Misc. 2d 584,
279 N.Y.S.2d 272 (1967), the New York court said: "[T]he police power does not authorize statutes
requiring a citizen to protect his own physical well being." Id. at 590, 279 N.Y.S. 2d at 278.
22. See, e.g., People v. Smallwood, 52 Misc. 2d 1027, 1028,277 N.Y.S.2d 429,432 (1967) ("The
statute ... simply removes from the individual the right to exercise his judgment, or preference, in
the use of personal adornment, even though capricious."); State v. Betts, 21 Ohio Misc. 175, 177,252
N.E.2d 866, 868 (Franklin County Mun. Ct. 1969) (" 'Liberty' . . . means 'the right to be free in the
enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraints as are necessary for the common welfare (emphasis in original)' ").
23. The equal protection argument is that the government has unreasonably classified
motorcyclists and unjustly regulated them on that basis. In Everhardt v. City of New Orleans, 208 So.
2d 423 (La. Ct. App. 1968), the court agreed, stating: "Further, we conclude the ordinance also denies
plaintiffs the equal protection of laws in that it imposes undue restrictions on one class of the motoring
public without any salutary effect to the public at large." Id. at 426.
24. See Love v. Bell, 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118 (1970).
25. Those opposing motorcycle helmet laws have attacked the efficacy of helmets on primarily
three grounds: (1) that helmets can themselves cause the neck and spinal injuries found in injured,
helmeted cyclists; (2) that helmets dangerously restrict a rider's peripheral vision; and (3) that helmets
dangerously reduce a cyclist's hearing. These claims, however, are seriously undercut by numerous
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Prior to its repeal,26 the constitutionality of Ohio's helmet law had
been tested in three different state courts, with varying results. In State v.
Craig,27 the Court of Appeals for Seneca County found the statute to bear
''a real and substantial relation to the public health and general welfare
and . . . thus [to be] a valid exercise of the [state's] police
power .... ,,28 Similarly, the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, in
State v. Stouffer,29 held that the police power is broad enough to include,
as a legitimate interest, protection of individuals from the consequences of
their own carelessness.3 ° In State v. Betts,31 however, a Franklin County
Municipal Court judge found the Craig analysis "remote, tenuous, and
speculative" 32 and, refusing to follow it, held the Ohio statute to be beyond
the police power of the state.33
reports and studies advocating the effectiveness of helmets in reducing head injuries. See, e.g.,
MARYLAND MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF HIGHWAY SAFETY PROGRAMS, A REVIEW OF
CONFLICTING REPORTS CONCERNING THE SAFETY OF MOTORCYCLE HELMETS (Dec. 1969) (memoran-
dum prepared for the Maryland General Assembly); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, HEAD
PROTECTION OF THE CYCLIST (April 1977); Hames & Petrucelli, What the Experts Think about
Motorcycle Helmets, TRAFFIC SAFETY, Sept. 197 1, at 26; UNITED STATES DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION,
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, MOTORCYCLE SAFETY-THE CASE FOR
HELMET USE (DOT HS-801 836 Feb. 1976); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, FIELD OF VIEW WITH AND WITHOUT MOTORCYCLE
HELMETS (Technical Report Oct. 1975); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, NATIONAL HIGH-
WAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, EFFECT ON SAFETY HELMETS ON AUDITORY CAPABILITY
(DOT HS-801 759 Sept. 1975).
26. 1978 LAWS OF OHIO 5-47 (Baldwin). Section 4511.53, as amended, reads in pertinent part:
No person shall operate or be a passenger on a snowmobile or motorcycle without using
safety glasses or other protective eye device. No person who is under the age of eighteen years,
or who holds a motorcycle operator's endorsement or license bearing a "novice" designation
that is currently in effect as provided in section 4507.13 of the Revised Code, shall operate a
motorcycle on a highway, or be a passenger on a motorcycle, unless wearing a protective
helmet on his head, and no other person shall be a passenger on a motorcycle operated by
such a person unless similarly wearing a protective helmet . . . . The provisions of this
paragraph or a violation thereof shall not be used in the trial of any civil action.
OHlO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.53 (Supp. 1979) (eff. July 10, 1978).
27. 19 Ohio App. 2d 29, 249 N.E.2d 75 (1969).
28. Id. at 32, 249 N.E.2d at 78. The court went on to explain:
We believe that with the great increase of motorcycles on the highways, a motorcyclist
who loses control of his vehicle because he is struck on his bare head by an object, constitutes
a hazard to other users of the highway who may be struck by a motorcycle which has gone out
of control.
Id.
29. 28 Ohio App. 2d 229, 276 N.E.2d 651 (1971).
30. The court stated:
[Tlhe state of Ohio has a legitimate concern for the protection of a motorcyclist and passenger
when using public roads. The legislation is reasonably related to reducing deaths and injuries.
The motorcycle operator and passenger are susceptible to greater danger on modem
highways than other motor vehicles. This type vehicle provides less protection for the driver
and passenger. Further, there are human effects of personal losses, as well as economic
consequences, such as time lost from work, increased insurance rates and property damage,
among others.
IL at 233, 276 N.E.2d at 654.
31. 21 Ohio Misc. 175, 252 N.E.2d 866 (1969).
32. lIt. at 183, 252 N.E.2d at 871.
33. The court reasoned that the statutory requirement of wearing a helmet would not alleviate
any real and substantial public danger and that
fiJncluded in a man's "liberty" is the freedom to be as foolish, foolhardy or reckless as he may
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C. The "Death" of Helmet- Use Laws
From the time the Highway Safety Act of 1966 was enacted and
mandatory helmet laws were required by the Transportation Department,
interest groups representing motorcycle enthusiasts vehemently expressed
their opposition.34 Although forty-seven of the fifty states enacted helmet
statutes in one form or another, the conflict grew intense between the
federal government and the three states (California, Illinois, and Utah)
that had refused to enact legislation. 35 In 1975, the Transportation Depart-
ment began sanction proceedings against these states, the result of which
would have been withdrawal of substantial federal highway funding.
3 6
Those proceedings were thwarted when Congress passed the Highway
Safety Act of 1976,' 7 which withdrew from the Secretary of Transporta-
tion the authority to require state helmet-use laws.38
The 1976 Act made it inevitable that a number of state legislatures
would repeal their helmet laws as legislators faced increasing pressure from
various interest groups and their political constituencies. Arguments based
on notions such as "freedom of choice," which had failed to influence most
of the courts, began to carry the day in the state legislatures. The repeal
movement began quickly and during the remainder of 1976, nine states
repealed their helmet statutes.39 In 1977, the momentum of the movement
peaked with fourteen states repealing their statutes,40 and in 1978, four
wish, so long as others are not endangered thereby. The State of Ohio has no legitimate
concern with whether or not an individual cracks his skull while motorcycling. That is his
personal risk.
Id. at 185, 252 N.E.2d at 872.
34. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 28, 1976, at 50, col. 6 (thousands of motorcyclists demonstrate at
Wisconsin state capitol). The American Motorcyclist Association (AMA) was the primary lobbyist
against helmet laws. Gary Winn, that organization's legislative analyst, noted that "[t]he AMA has
always urged the use of good quality safety gear . . . . Helmets are the most important and crucial
part of that gear . . . . So we urge the voluntary use of helmets while we oppose laws governing their
use." Motorcyclist Association Urges Use of Helmets, in 2 OHIoTRAFFIC SAFETY EDUCATION CENTER,
NEwsLINE 4 (No. 2, June 1978).
35. N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1975, at 39, col. 3.
36. Why Motorcycle Deaths are Soaring, U.S. NEWs& WORLD REPORT, Sept. 4,1978, at 35,36.
37. Pub. L. No. 94-280, tit. II, 90 Stat. 451 (1976).
38. Id. § 208(a). The amendment to this effect was offered by Senator Alan Cranston of
California-which was in danger of losing $50 million in federal highway funding. 121 CONG. REC.
40261 (Dec. 21, 1975).
39. 1976 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 230.31 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.245 (Michie 1978) to
apply only to minors); 1976 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 57, § 2 (amending ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-964
(West 1976) (under 18)); 1976 Conn. Pub. Acts 76-326, § I (repealing CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-289e
(West 1970 & Supp. 1977)); 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245, § 527 (repealing IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.446 (West
Supp. 1979-80)); 1976 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 51, § I (amending KAN. STAT. § 8-1598 (Supp. 1979) (under
16), subsequently amended by 1979 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 41, § 1 (under 18)); 1976 La. Acts Act No. 671,
§ I (amending LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32:190 (West Supp. 1980)); 1976 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 81, § I
(amending OKrLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §40-105 (West Supp. 1979) (under 18)); 1976 R.I. Pub. Laws ch.
104, § I (amending R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-10.1-4 (1969) & Supp. 1978)); 1976 S.D. SEss. LAWS ch. 194,
§ I (amending S. D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 32-20-4 (1976) (under 18)).
40. 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 1899, §§ 1,2 (repealing COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4.231(2) (1973 & Supp.
1978)); 1977 Haw. Sess. Laws ch. 183, § I (amending HAW. REV. STAT. § 286-81 (1976) (under 18));
1977 Ind. Acts, Pub. L. No. 135, § I (repealing IND. CODE ANN. § 9-8-9-3 (Burns 1973)); Me. Acts ch. 22
(repealing ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29, § 1373 (1967)); 1977 Minn. Laws ch. 17, § 2 (amending MINN. STAT.
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more states,41 one of which was Ohio,42 followed. Only a few states have
been successful in turning back repeal efforts. 3
D. Statistical Effects of the Repeal Movement
The most immediate effect of the repeal movement has been, as
anticipated by repeal opponents, an increase in the motorcycle fatality
rate. The reason, of course, is that without mandatory helmet-use laws,
fewer motorcyclists wear helmets and, consequently, a greater proportion
of these cyclists sustain fatal or serious head injuries from accidents. The
statistical trend has been documented in several recent surveys,44 the
results of which indicate that: (1) in those states that have repealed their
helmet-use laws, helmet usage has dropped thirty to forty percent;45 (2)
during the period that federal requirements were in effect, the fatality rate
dropped consistently, finally reaching its nadir, five per 10,000 cyclists, in
1976;46 and (3) motorcycle fatalities have increased in the states that have
47repealed their helmet laws. While this statistical relationship is an
ANN. § 169.974 (West Supp. 1980) (under 18)); 1977 Mont. Laws ch. 54, § 1 (amending MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 61-9-417 (1979) (under 18)); 1977 Neb. Laws, Leg. Bill 314, § 7 (repealing NEB. REV.
STAT. § 60-403.02 (1978)); 1977 N.H. Laws ch. 173, § I (amending N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 263:29-b
(Supp. 1979) (under 18)); 1977 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 355, § 3 (amending N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-10.2-06
(Supp. 1979) (under 18)); 1977 Or. Laws ch. 410, § 291 (amending OR. REV. STAT. § 487.730 (1967)
(under 18)); 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 162, § I (amending TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701c-3, §2
(Vernon 1977) (under 18)); 1977 Utah Laws oh. 267, § I (amending UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-107.8
(Supp. 1979) (under 18)); 1977 Wash. Laws ch. 355, § 55 (repealing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §46.37.530
(1970)); 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 204, § I (amending Wis. STAT. ANN. § 347-485 (West 1971) (under 18)
(overriding veto)).
41. 61 Del. Laws ch. 314 (1978) (amending DEL. CODE tit. 21, § 4185 (Michie 1979) (over 18 must
have helmet in possession, under 18 required to wear)); 1978 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 323, § I (amending
IDAHO CODE § 49-761A (1967) (under 18)); 1978 N.M. Laws ch. 35, § 460 (amending N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 64-18-55.1, recodified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-356 (Michie 1978) (under 18));see also note 42 infra.
42. 1978 LAWS OF OHIo 5-47 (Baldwin) (amending OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4511.53 (Page 1973
& Supp. 1978) (under 18)).
43. For example, the governors of three states have successfully vetoed helmet repeal efforts-
Virginia (in 1977), Maryland (in 1978), and Massachusetts (in 1978) .13 IIHS, THE HIGHWAY Loss
REDUCTION STATUS REPORT, Nos. 8 and 11. In his veto message, Governor Dukakis of
Massachusetts said:
These chilling statistics [citing figures on motorcycle fatalities] clearly outweigh any
philosophical arguments that center around each person's presumed right to decide for
himself how much risk to life or limb he will take. Such arguments fade into abstraction when
measured against the very real tragedy that afflicts the family of each person who dies
unnecessarily.
Id. No. 1I, at 1I. In 1979, the Maryland legislature amended the state helmet statute, MD. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. § 21-1306 (1977), to require helmets only on "minors." 1979 Md. Laws ch. 746.
44. The more extensive surveys of nationwide trends have been compiled by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), a division of the U.S. Department of
Transportation (USDOT), and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), an independent,
non-profit educational and scientific organization supported by the insurance industry. The author
would like to thank both organizations for their assistance during the preparation of this article.
45. USDOT, NHTSA, MOTORCYCLE HELMETS: CLAIMS AND FACTS (DOT HS 802 732 January
1978).
46. Why Motorcycle Deaths are Soaring, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 4, 1978, at 35.
47. Deaths, Injuries Mount in Helmet Law Repeal Areas, 13 INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR
HIGHWAY SAFETY, THE HIGHWAY Loss REDUCTION STATUS REPORT 7 (No. 12, Aug. 21, 1978).
Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of this point is made by the motorcycle fatality statistics for the
state of Ohio during the month of July 1978, the month in which the helmet-law repeal took effect. In
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important consideration in evaluating the wisdom of the repealing
legislatures, it is more pertinent in the context of this article in evaluating
the wisdom of the cyclist who chooses to ride helmetless. It is to the legal
ramifications of the latter evaluation that the discussion now turns.
III. THE PRESENT STATUS AND PROJECTED TREND
OF THE "MOTORCYCLE HELMET DEFENSE"
A. Existing Case Law
The "motorcycle helmet defense" is of recent origin and, to date, its
use by defense attorneys has been rather infrequent, appearing in only
three reported cases. Moreover, virtually no attention has been accorded
the defense in law reviews and other legal periodicals.48
The first reported case was Rogers v. Frush,49 a 1970 decision handed
down by Maryland's court of last resort. A father brought suit on behalf of
his minor son for injuries the helmetless son sustained while riding a
motorcycle and colliding with a negligent motorist. On appeal from a
judgment for plaintiff, defendant claimed the trial court erred in excluding
medical testimony0 offered to prove that: (1) the minor's failure to wear a
helmet amounted to contributory negligence; (2) such conduct amounted
to his assuming the risk of the consequences of the accident; and (3)
because the minor could have avoided the consequences of the collision he
should not recover for those injuries that could have been prevented by his
wearing a helmet. The court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff and
rejected each of these theories of the "helmet defense."'51
Responding to the contributory negligence theory, the court relied on
the traditional tort doctrine that one is not under a duty to anticipate the
negligent acts of another52 and that "[i]t is not every action on the part of a
litigant which an opponent by way of 'second guessing' or hindsight may
the first nine days of the month, when the requirement was still in effect, six motorcyclists lost their
lives, two of whom were not wearing helmets. From the day the repeal took effect to the end of the
month, 29 motorcyclists's deaths were reported, 20 of which were helmetless. Interview with John R.
Pichter, Systems Evaluation Specialist, Ohio Dep't of Highway Safety, in Columbus, Ohio (Oct. 2,
1978).
48. The only legal commentary discovered by the author's research on the topic is: Annot., 40
A.L.R.3d 856 (1971).
49. 257 Md. 233, 262 A.2d 549 (1970).
50. The proffered testimony was that of a qualified neurosurgeon with expertise in the field of
investigating automobile accidents. That witness was willing to testify that had the minor worn a
helmet, the chance of his sustaining the injuries would have been reduced by 50% and the chance of
suffering a skull fracture would have been reduced by 90%. Id. at 237-38, 262 A.2d at 551.
51. Defendant also argued contributory negligence per se on appeal, a theory unavailable to him
in the trial court because Maryland's mandatory helmet law was enacted subsequent to the trial court
judgment, but prior to the hearing on appeal. The appellate court remarked: "The fact that the General
Assembly almost three years after the accident saw fit to require the wearing of such a protective helmet
would not be sufficient ground for concluding that as of the time of the accident such a standard of
conduct was expected by the general public. ... Id. at 239, 262 A.2d at 552.
52. The court quoted from another Maryland case, Sanders v. Williams, 209 Md. 149, 120 A.2d
397 (1956):
One is charged with notice of what a reasonably and ordinarily prudent person would have
foreseen and so must foresee what common experience tells may, in all likelihood, occur, and
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successfully label as contributory negligence."53 Also, the court quickly
disposed of the assumption of risk theory to the "helmet defense" by
refusing to find that the minor voluntarily exposed himself to a known
danger or consented to the defendant's negligent conduct so as to relieve
him of his duty to act with due care. 4 Finally, the court ruled that defense
counsel's avoidable consequences theory was inapplicable to the facts of
the case. 5 Noting that by definition the doctrine of avoidable conse-
quences ordinarily places a duty upon an injured plaintiff to exercise
reasonable diligence in avoiding or minimizing the consequences of a
defendant's wrong, the court determined the case to be inappropriate for
the traditional application of the doctrine, which comes into play and
imposes upon a plaintiff a duty to minimize his damages only after a
defendant has committed the wrongful act.5 6 In this situation, the minors
failure to wear a helmet came before the defendant's negligence and,
therefore, the minor child could not be charged with a breach of duty when
none could be said to exist.
The second reported "motorcycle helmet defense" case, with an
almost identical factual pattern, is the 1971 Minnesota Supreme Court
decision of Burgstahler v. Fox. 7 At the trial level, defense counsel
attempted to cross-examine the plaintiff concerning his nonuse of a helmet
as a basis for contending that the nonuse caused the plaintiff's partial loss
of smell. 8 The trial judge disallowed the questioning and on appeal from a
judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant claimed error by asserting that the
"plaintiff was negligent or .. .had assumed the risk of injury because he
failed to wear a safety helmet." 59 Although Minnesota was without a
mandatory helmet-use statute in effect at the time of the accident,
defendant argued the contributory negligence theory of the "helmet
defense" on the basis of a city ordinance requiring helmet usage by
motorcycle operators of rented machines.60 In a brief opinion, citing
to anticipate and guard against what usually happens. On the other hand, one is not bound to
anticipate every possible injury that may occur or every possible eventuality.
Id. at 239, 262 A.2d at 552.
53. Id. The court relied extensively on the case of Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65
(1968), an action for personal injuries in which the defendant sought to invoke the "seat belt defense."
That defense, as the name implies, seeks to impose at least partial responsibility for his injuries on the
plaintiff, who, at the time of the accident, was not wearing his seat belt. The defenses origin has been
traced to Stockinger v. Dunisch, No. _(Cir. Ct. Sheboygan Co., Wis. 1964). Kircher, The Seat Belt
Defense-State of the Law, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 172 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Kircher].
54. 257 Md. at 243, 262 A.2d at 552. See text accompanying note 178 infra.
55. The Rogers court drew heavily on the case of Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65
(1965), in which the court found the doctrine of avoidable consequences inappropriate to the seat belt
situation. The Rogers court held, by analogy, that it did not apply in the context of the "helmet
defense - either.
56. 257 Md. at 240, 262 A.2d at 552-4. But see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS,
§ 65, at 423-24 (4th ed. 1971).
57. 290 Minn. 495, 186 N.W.2d 182 (1971).
58. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 3-5.
59. I. at 3.
60. 290 Minn. at 496, 186 N.W.2d at 183.
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Rogers as authority, the court rejected defendant's arguments and found
the ordinance inapplicable, since plaintiff owned his motorcycle.6t Neither
defendant nor the court specifically addressed the assumption of risk
theory.
The most recent "helmet defense" case is the 1973 case of Dean v.
Holland,62 decided by a New York supreme court. The case arose out of a
collision between a car and the minor operator of a minibike, which fell
within the definition of a motorcycle under New York law. In discovery
proceedings, defense counsel moved to depose plaintiff respecting his
failure to wear a helmet at the time of the accident. Plaintiff refused to
submit to such questioning. On defendant's motion to compel discovery,
the court held that plaintiff was required to appear for examination and
answer the questions at issue.
Although it is not stated in the opinion what defendant asserted in
support of his motion, the court addressed two of the three theories
underlying the "helmet defense." The court, noting that New York had a
mandatory helmet usage statute in effect at the time of the accident, stated:
A party violating a statute of this character is chargeable with negligence
for its violation provided there is a causal relation between the failure to wear
a helmet and the happening of an accident. The court is unable to perceive
how a violation of this statute caused or contributed to the causing of the
accident, or was a proximate cause of the collision. 4
The court went on, however, to note that plaintiff's failure to wear a
helmet could have been a substantial factor in causing his injuries and,
therefore, a jury would be entitled to apportion the damages if sufficient
evidence were produced showing that plaintiff could have avoided some or
all of the injuries by wearing a helmet.6 5 It is unclear from the opinion
under which theory of the helmet defense the court would have allowed
apportioning of damages.66
B. Present Status and Projected Trend
Two observations can be made on the basis of these three cases. First,
the "motorcycle helmet defense" has seen little use by defense attorneys,
and second, its status is anything but settled. Analyzing the three earlier
posited theories of the "helmet defense," these tentative conclusions can be
drawn from the decisions:
(1) There appears to be no hope for the assumption of risk theory as
the Rogers court strongly rejected it and the Fox and Holland
courts did not even address it.
61. Id. As in Rogers, the court in Fox refused to consider the applicability of the state's helmet-
use law, which had become effective before appeal but subsequent to the accident. Id.
62. 76 Misc. 2d 517, 350 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1973).
63. Id. at 518-19, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 861-62.
64. Id. at 519, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
65. Id. at 518-19, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 861-62.
66. The case is not further reported and, presumably, it was settled.
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(2) The contributory negligence theory appears to have some vitality,
but the extent of that vitality is uncertain.
(a) Common law contributory negligence seems to be un-
available to defense counsel as all three courts rejected it;
(b) the use of per se contributory negligence was intimated to be
viable in the Rogers and Fox cases,67 but the Holland court
rejected it.
(3) There appears to be a split in authority with regard to the mitigation
of damages or avoidable consequences theory in reducing plain-
tiff's recovery. The Rogers court explicitly rejected it, but the
Holland court accepted some form of it. The theory was not prof-
fered or discussed in the Fox case.
While the above gives little cause for celebration, defense counsel
should not conclude that the "helmet defense" will only on rare occasions
yield success. The "helmet defense" will no doubt increase in attention
given the fact that the repeal movement has led and will lead to more
helmetless riders on our highways. The three cases summarized above can
hardly be said to have settled the issues or the law relating to this type of
defense. Moreover, the apparent lack of judicial authority may be
compensated for by legislative authority. For example, in 1977, apparently
in response to the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Fox, the
Minnesota legislature amended that state's helmet statute to allow counsel
to introduce evidence of helmet nonuse in order to reduce the cyclist's
recovery by an amount attributable to those injuries that could- have been
avoided by his wearing a helmet.68 Finally, the probability of successfully
asserting the "helmet defense" must be measured in light of recent-mostly
favorable-developments relating to its analogous counterpart, the "seat
belt defense., 69 Thus, it is much too early to discard or even downgrade the
defense as a weapon in defense counsel's arsenal.
The remainder of this article will attempt to answer two primary
questions with regard to the "helmet defense": (1) under what tort theories,
including the three originally set forth, can defense counsel successfully
assert the "helmet defense"; and (2) to what extent can counsel expect to
succeed once the "helmet defense" is successfully asserted-in other words,
can the plaintiff-cyclist's recovery be totally barred, or only limited?
67. See notes 51, 61 supra.
68. 1977 Minn. Laws ch. 17, (amending MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.974(b) (West Supp. 1980)).
This amendment provides in part:
In an action to recover damages for negligence resulting in any head injury to an operator or
passenger of a motorcycle, evidence of whether or not the injured person was wearing
protective headgear of a type approved by the commissioner shall be admissible only with
respect to the question of damages for head injuries. Damages for head injuries of any person
who was not wearing protective headgear shall be reduced to the extent that those injuries
could have been avoided by wearing protective headgear of a type approved by the
commission. For the purposes of this subdivision "operator or passenger" means any
operator or passenger regardless of whether that operator or passengerwas required by law to
wear protective headgear approved by the commissioner.
This amendment may also indicate some "horsetrading" in the legislative halls, since this same act
repealed the helmet mandate for cyclists over age 18. See note 40 supra.
69. See note 53 supra.
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IV. POSSIBLE THEORIES IN ASSERTING THE "HELMET DEFENSE"
It is clear that this article's use of the term "helmet defense" is merely a
shorthand means of describing a specific factual situation. Remaining is
the task of bringing those facts within an accepted legal framework by
which the operative effect of their existence can be determined.
Unfortunately, a perusal of the cases that pertain to the "helmet" and "seat
belt" defenses reveals the lack of succinctly articulated theories upon which
the defenses have been asserted.7° Unless counsel carefully pleads his case,
specifically asserting the "helmet defense" in terms readily recognizable to
the court, the result might be the court confusing the theories and
ultimately striking the defense.
A. Contributory Negligence
In order to base a "helmet defense" on the traditional doctrine of
contributory negligence, counsel must prove every element of that
doctrine. As Dean Prosser points out, four elements must be proved to
establish contributory negligence on the part of another: (1) that P had a
duty to conform to prescribed standard of care, (2) that P breached that
duty, (3) that P sustained actual injuries, and (4) that a causal connection
exists between P's breach and his resulting injuries.71 It is given that Psus-
tained grave injuries. Further, by riding helmetless, P breached whatever
duty to wear a helmet that might be imposed upon him. Remaining is a de-
tailed discussion concerning the imposition of a duty on Pto wear a helmet
and the causal relationship between his failing to do so and his injuries.
1. Imposing a Duty to Conform to a Reasonable
Standard of Care
a. Statutory Duty- The Availability of Helmet- Use
Statute and Contributory Negligence Per se
The initial question to be faced by defense counsel contemplating
assertion of the "helmet defense" in a case similar to the hypothetical is
whether the jurisdiction in which the collision occurred has a mandatory
helmet-use statute. If that state is one of the twenty that has retained its
statute,72 or if the accident occurred in a city with an ordinance prescribing
helmet use, 73 the plaintiff-cyclist's violation provides counsel with the
70. See text accompanying notes 49-66 supra and notes 92-93 infra.
71. PROSSER, supra note 56, § 30, at 143.
72. ALA. CODE § 32-12-40 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1703 (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 316.211 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 68A-1306 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. § 189.285 (1971 &
Supp. 1978); MAss. ANN. LAWS c.90, § 7 (Law. Co-op 1975 & Supp. 1979); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN.
§ 257.658 (West 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-7-64 (Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 302.020 (Vernon
1972); NEv. REV. STAT. § 486.231 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:3-76.7 (West 1973); N.Y. VEH. &TRAF.
LAW § 381 (McKinney 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-140.4 (1978); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3525
(Purdon 1977); S.C. CODE § 56-5-3660 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-934 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, § 1256 (1978); VA. CODE §46.1-172 (1974); W. VA. CODE § 17C-15-44 (1974); Wyo. STAT. § 31-5-116
(Supp. 1979).
73. This writer has no knowledge of an existing helmet ordinance; however, an official at the
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following argument: The helmet statute or ordinance prescribes a clear
legislative standard of conduct to which a reasonable motorcyclist would
adhere in protecting himself, and P's deviation from this standard in
violating the statute was contributory negligence as a matter of law.74 As
persuasive as this approach first sounds, there are, nonetheless, a number
of other considerations requiring counsel's attention before the "helmet
defense" can be successfully employed under this theory.
First, the statute, in addition to prescribing certain types of conduct
with regard to the wearing of a helmet, may expressly exclude the
imposition of civil liability for a violation of the statute. For example,
both the original and the existing Ohio helmet statute state that "the
provisions of [the statute] or a violation thereof shall not be used in the trial
of any civil action. 75
Second, even without any express statement concerning civil liability
a court must determine whether the helmet statute has any bearing upon
the standard of care required of a plaintiff-cyclist. In other words, counsel
must realize that although the jurisdiction may have a helmet statute, the
court facing a civil action is not required to adopt or borrow it in setting the
standard of care for a reasonable cyclist. The plaintiff's failure to conform
with a highway safety statute simply may not constitute negligent conduct
in the eyes of the court.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides some guidelines and
outlines the ultimate issues in this context.76 In the hypothetical case, for
example, the issues defense counsel must address are twofold: (1) whether
P is within the class of persons that the statute is intended to protect, and
(2) whether the injuries to Pare the risks the statute is designed to preclude.
Analyzing these issues, one is led to the conclusion that the statute is, in
fact, intended to protect motorcyclists from substantial head injuries
resulting from accidents. The legislative history of the 1968 federal
Ohio Highway Safety Department indicated that at one time the city of Youngstown considered
this type of ordinance. Interview with Georgia Jupinko, infra note 78. There is a city ordinance in the
small Ohio city of Brooklyn requiring drivers and passengers of motor vehicles to wear seat belts,
reported in 10 FOR THE DEFENSE 27 (1967).
74. See PROSSER, supra note 56, § 36, at 202-03 for a discussion of the basic premise.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965) defines contributory negligence as "conduct on the part
of the plaintiffwhich falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and
which is a legally contributing cause co-operating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing
about plaintiffs harm."
75. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.53 (Page 1973 & Supp. 1979). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
140.4 (1978) (cannot use for either common law or per se). But cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169-974(b)
(West Supp. 1980) (expressly requiring an apportioning of damages, if causation is proved when
violation is shown), note 68 supra.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965) provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a
legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be
exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.
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mandate,77 the primary debates within the state legislatures 78 and the
language of the courts upholding the constitutionality of state helmet
statutes have explicitly reflected this.79
The language and holdings in the previously mentioned helmet cases
indicate that courts are willing to accept this characterization of
mandatory helmet laws, if properly presented. The Holland court found
New York's helmet statute to impose a statutory standard of conduct upon
the cyclist, 80 while the courts in Rogers and Fox implied that if a helmet
statute had been in effect at the time of the accident, it would have
established the standard of care.8" Further support can be found in the seat
belt cases. Although states have seat belt installation statutes,82 there are
no general mandatory seat belt usage statutes in existence.83 Because of
this, courts entertaining the "seat belt defense" are not willing to find, as a
matter of law, a beltless motorist in breach of a particular standard of
conduct expected of ordinary motorists.84 There are dicta in these cases,
however, strongly suggesting that if belt-usage statutes existed, they would
establish the standard of care in civil cases.85
77. 23 C.F.R. § 1204.4 (1979). The stated purpose of the Secretary's regulation was "[t]o assure
that motorcycles, motorcycle operators, and their passengers meet standards which contribute to safe
operation and protection against injuries." The Secretary's findings included the following:
Deaths and injuries from motorcycle accidents doubled between 1963 and 1965. This fact is
particularly alarming when it is understood that most of those killed and injured were young
people under the age of 25. Motorcycle registrations have jumped from 574,080 in 1960 to
1,914,700 in 1966. By 1970 the annual increase is expected to reach 1 million per year.
Motorcycle safety takes on grave dimensions in view of the fact that since 1960 the rate of
motorcycle fatalities has increased at about the same rate as the number of motorcycles.
USDOT/FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, STAFF MEMORANDUM ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTION PRESENTED BY STATE MOTORCYCLE HEADGEAR REQUIREMENTS (Jan. 1970).
78. The Ohio General Assembly was particularly interested in protection of the cyclist. Interview
with Georgia Jupinko, Ohio Dep't of Highway Safety, in Columbus, Ohio (Nov. 6, 1978).
79. See, e.g., note 30 supra.
80. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
81. See notes 51, 61 and accompanying text supra.
82. As of 1974, 34 states and the District of Columbia had seat belt installation statutes. Hoglund
& Parsons, Caveat Viator: The Duty to Wear Seat Belts Under Comparative Negligence Law, 50
WASH. L. REv. 1, 7 n.19 (1974). See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4513.262 (Page 1973).
83. Many state legislatures, including Ohio, have considered enacting mandatory seat belt usage
laws. There are some statutes requiring seat belt usage in certain circumstances, e.g., CAL. VEHICLE
CODE § 27304 (West 1971) (drivers and passengers in driver's training autos); R. 1. GEN. LAWS § 31-23-
41 (1968) (drivers of public service vehicles).
It has been suggested that the seat belt installation statutes implicitly require belt use. See Amend
v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 139, 570 P.2d 138, 147 (1977) (Horowitz, J., dissenting); Note, Seat Belt
Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 288, 289. Courts, however, have uniformly
rejected this proposition. See, e.g., Bertsch v. Spears, 20 Ohio App. 2d 137, 252 N.E.2d 194 (1969);
Roberts v. Bohn, 26 Ohio App. 2d 50, 269 N.E.2d 53 (1971); and note 85 infra.
84. Lawrence v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 784 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Cierpisz v.
Singleton, 247 Md. 215, 230 A.2d 629 (1967); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444,323 N.E.2d 164 (1974);
Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
85. In Roberts v. Bohn, 26 Ohio App. 2d 50, 58, 269 N.E.2d 53, 59 (1971), the court stated: "We
conclude that in the absence of any statute to the contrary, there is no duty on the part of an occupant of
an automobile to anticipate another's negligence and to protect his own safety by such precautions as
wearing available seat belts." And, in Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, (1974), theNew
York Court of Appeals said:
Since section 383 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law does not require occupants of a
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Once a court agrees to adopt a helmet statute as prescribing the
standard of care, a third consideration for counsel is the weight the court
will place on the statute's violation. In other words, the issue focuses on
whether, in that jurisdiction, the violation of a highway safety statute is
negligence per se or merely evidence of negligence.8 6 If a violation
constitutes negligence per se, the use of the per se theory in asserting the
"helmet defense" can carry the day for defense counsel. But if a statutory
violation is merely evidence of negligence, counsel's task in successfully
asserting the "helmet defense" becomes more difficult, since he must also
argue common-law contributory negligence.87
The fourth and final consideration in evaluating the efficacy of the
per se theory in a particular case is whether the motorcyclist had a
reasonable excuse for violating the statute. The Restatement (Second) of
Torts sets forth specific criteria by which to determine whether a violation
of a statute is excused and thus unavailable as evidence of contributory
negligence. Specifically, the Restatement would excuse violations when:
(a) the violation is reasonable because of the actor's incapacity;
(b) he neither knows nor should know of the occasion for com-
pliance;
(c) he is unable after reasonable diligence or care to comply;
(d) he is confronted by an emergency not due to his own mis-
conduct;
(e) compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the
actor or to others. 88
All of this, however, is applicable only in jurisdictions with helmet
statutes, either in absolute or some limited form. 9 For counsel who find
themselves without the benefit of a statute, the preceding discussion is of
lesser importance. They, and their counterparts in jurisdictions in which
the violation of a statute is only evidence of negligence, will have to base
the "helmet defense" on the common-law theory of contributory
negligence.
b. Common-Law Duty
Generally speaking, a motorcyclist has a duty to exercise the care for
passenger car to make use of available seat belts, we hold that plaintiff's failure to do so does
not constitute negligence per se. Even in jurisdictions in which some form of the seat belt
defense has been adopted, the negligence per se approach has been rejected because
legislation, which does not require use of the device, "cannot be considered a safety statute in
a sense that it is negligenceperse for an occupant of an automobile to fail to use available seat
belts.-
Id. at 450-51, 323 N.E.2d at 167-68, quoting Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 385, 149 N.W.2d 626,
639 (1967).
86. See PROSSER, supra note 56, § 36, at 200-03.
87. See section IV(A)(1)(b) infra.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965).
89. See notes 39-42 supra.
1980]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
his own safety that a reasonable person would exercise under the same or
similar circumstances. Other motorists, in turn, have a right to assume that
cyclists will exercise reasonable care for their own safety and will not
unnecessarily expose themselves to danger. Therefore, whether P in the
hypothetical acted unreasonably must be determined by judicial authority
and the underlying rationale of the elements that comprise the concept of
duty.
The Rogers and Fox courts disposed of the duty issue with haste and,
unfortunately, without sufficient analysis. Each court was unwilling to
impose on a motorcyclist a duty to wear a helmet without a mandatory
helmet-usage statute in effect at the time the accident occurred.9 For the
most part, the same result has been reached by courts entertaining the "seat
belt defense."9' Counsel should not become discouraged, however, on the
basis of these decisions. A sound argument can and should be made
concerning the imposition of a duty to wear a helmet on a cyclist such as P.
Two points support this proposition. First, the Rogers and Fox courts
based their findings entirely on the majority of judicial authority focusing
on the "seat belt defense." Although the "helmet defense" in many respects
is analogous to the "seat belt defense," the two are definitely dis-
tinguishable with regard to the imposition of a duty to wear one safety
device as opposed to the other. Second, there is a minority of decisions
holding contributory negligence to be a viable theory for asserting the "seat
belt defense, ' 92 and in a great many of the cases in which a court held
otherwise, the rationale has centered on the causation issue rather than the
duty issue.93 These points will be highlighted within the following
discussion of the elements of the duty concept.
Dean Prosser offers the following as a framework for determining
whether a duty should be imposed on P to wear his helmet:
It is fundamental that the standard of conduct which is the basis of the law of
negligence is determined by balancing the risk, in the light of the social value
of the interest threatened, and the probability and extent of the harm, against
90. See notes 51, 61 supra.
91. See text accompanying notes 82-85 supra.
92. In Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 378, 149 N.W.2d 626, 640 (1967), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court said:
[I]t is obvious that, on the average, persons using seat belts are less likely to sustain injury and,
if injured, the injuries are likely to be less serious. On the basis of this experience, and as a
matter of common knowledge, an occupant of an automobile either knows or should know of
the additional safety factor produced by the use of seat belts.
In Remington v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289, 259 A.2d 145 (1969), the court held that a duty to wear a
seat belt might arise if, in a particular circumstance, a person would be expected to anticipate the risk of
a specific accident. See also Mays v. Dealers Transit, Inc., 441 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1971) (applying
Indiana law); Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 148 S.E.2d 154 (1966).
93. For example, in Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974), the court found
contributory negligence "applicable only if the plaintiff's failure to exercise due care causes, in whole or
in part, the accident, rather than when it merely exacerbates or enhances the severity of [plaintiff's]
injuries .... Id. at 450, 323 N.E.2d at 168 (emphasis in original). See also Noth v. Scheurer, 285 F.
Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Dillon v. Humphreys, 56 Misc. 2d 211, 288 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
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the value of the interest which the actor is seeking to protect, and the
expedience of the course pursued.94
In applying this formula, the magnitude of the risk when P decides to
ride helmetless, the probability or foreseeability of harm, the extent or
severity of the harm, and the social value in protecting P's interests must be
balanced against the social utility or value of P riding helmetless and the
burden or expedience of his taking adequate precautions, that is, wearing a
helmet.
In analyzing the magnitude of the risk P incurs when he decides to ride
without a helmet, one must first realize the nature and severity of the
potential harm. In this case, the nature of the harm should be obvious since
motorcyclists who ride without protective helmets incur a tremendous risk
of sustaining fatal or serious head injuries from accidents. Compared to
automobile occupants, one who rides a motorcycle incurs an increase in
risk of injury or death anyway;95 but, by not wearing protective headgear
this risk is significantly compounded. The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration reports that head injuries are the most frequent
single cause of death for both helmeted and unhelmeted cyclists, but the
risk of a fatal head injury for unhelmeted cyclists is as much as four times
greater than for helmeted cyclists. 96 Therefore, if one were to classify the
severity, extent, or gravity of this harm, it would certainly have to be
ranked extremely high.
With regard to the element of P's foreseeability, the argument
commonly made on behalf of P is that although cyclists are generally
charged with the duty to foresee reasonable dangers, they have a right to
assume that other persons on the highway will not be negligent.
Consequently, it is claimed that it is unfair to expect P to foresee or
anticipate every possible accident and resulting injury. This was precisely
the rationale of the Rogers court in rejecting defense counsel's assertion of
contributory negligence. 97
94. PROSSER, supra note 56, § 31, at 149.
95. NHTSA claims that because of the extreme vulnerability of motorcyclists their death rate is
three times that of auto or truck occupants. USDOT, NHTSA, FACT SHEET: MOTORCYCLE HELMETS-
THEY SAVE LIVES AND REDUCE INJURIES. NHTSA explains:
An automobile has more weight and bulk. It has door beams, bumpers and a roof to provide
some measure of protection from impacts or rollover. It has built-in cushioning to soften the
impact of a crash and safety belts to hold passengers in their seats. It has more stability
because of its four wheels, and, because of its size, is easier to see.
See also VIRGINIA HIGHWAY SAFETY DIVISION & HIGHWAY SAFETY COMMISSION, Nov. 1976 (reports
that risk of death to cyclists and accompanying passengers as compared to auto occupants is seven to
eight times greater per mile traveled).
96. US DOT, NHTSA, MOTORCYCLE DEATHS RISE AFTER REPEAL OF HELMET USE LAWS (June
29, 1978). See also 13 11HS, THE H IGHWAY Loss REDUCTION STATUS REPORT No. 8 (June 5, 1978) (cites
a Kansas study which found that the death rate for those not wearing a helmet at the time of the
accident was three times greater than the rate for those who were wearing a helmet); MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, OFFICE OF HIGHWAY SAFETY PLANNING, STATEMENT OPPOSING
REPEAL OF MICIIIGAN'S MOTORCYCLE HELMET LAW (Sept. 1976) (reports that a Nebraska study
indicated that head trauma was the cause attributed to 64% of the motorcycle fatalities studied).
97. See note 52 supra.
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There are numerous reasons why this argument is unpersuasive. First,
highway accidents or collisions are reasonably foreseeable. Highway
safety is a national concern in today's era of transportation. We are
constantly being subjected to safety campaigns and slogans telling us to
"drive with care," "buckle up for safety," and "watch out for the other
guy., 98 It may be true, as a matter of mathematical probability, that one
will not be involved in an accident when he takes to the highways, but
highway accidents are nonetheless common, highly publicized oc-
currences, and provide citizens with a general awareness of the dangers
when traveling. As one legal commentator on the use of seat belts has
argued, "the right to assume the due care of others exists only 'in the
absence of notice or knowledge to the contrary.' 'Automobile drivers
are . . . "on notice" concerning the possibility of an accident and should
be held responsible for such notice.' "99 Reasonable persons in an
automobile may not be under a specific duty to anticipate the possibility of
an accident with each trip to the grocery store, but those persons are aware
of the possibility of accidents and they must exercise ordinary care for their
own safety with respect to them. In the case of motorcycles, as the dangers
increase with their use, so should a cyclist's awareness of these dangers.
Second, the issue of foreseeability is much broader than simply
whether P should have reasonably foreseen the accident. It also must
include the consideration of whether P should have reasonably foreseen
the harm that would come about as a result of a possible accident. As
pointed out earlier, helmetless cyclists do, in fact, incur extremely high
risks. Surely they must realize that if for some unfortunate reason they
were to become involved in a collision and sustain even a minimal amount
of impact to their bare heads, a severe head injury or death could be the
result.'00 Cyclists choose not to wear helmets not because they foresee no
risks involved, but rather, because they enjoy their freedom. Therefore, as
with the hypothetical, it is more appropriate to say that P chose to ignore
the risks rather than to heed their possibility.
Third, as Dean Prosser notes, part of the duty analysis includes the
consideration that "[a]s the gravity of the possible harm increases, the
apparent likelihood of its occurrence need be correspondingly less."' 0 '
Prosser explains further that:
If the risk is an appreciable one, and the possible consequences are serious,
98. See Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 82, at 13.
99. Recent Developments, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 883, 893 (1975), citing Roberts v. Bohn, 26 Ohio
App. 2d 50, 269 N.E.2d 53 (1971) and Comment, Self Protective Safety Devices: An Economic
Analysis, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 421, 439 (1973).
100. Dr. Hugh H. Hurt, Jr., the principal investigator for the California research group
conducting a study on head impact and injury to a motorcyclist, drew the gruesome analogy that "[a]
helmetless head on pavement is like a watermelon." Interview with Mr. Herbert Knox, Legislative and
Regulatory Affairs, Nationwide Insurance Co., in Columbus, Ohio (Oct. 27, 1978) (from notes in his
file).
101. PROSSER, supra note 56, § 31, at 147.
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the question is not one of mathematical probability alone. The odds may be a
thousand to one that no train will arrive at the very moment that an
automobile is crossing a railway track, but the risk of death is nevertheless
sufficiently serious to require the driver to look for the train.1
0 2
It might be argued by P that under the particular circumstances-a
Sunday afternoon, nice weather, and his riding only around the
community-a reasonable person would not have worn a helmet. Such an
argument, in essence, asserts that the scope of foreseeability and the
magnitude of P's risk decreases when P rides around his community as
opposed to his riding on an interstate highway. The difficulty with this
argument, however, is that, as in the hypothetical, brain damage or instant
death can occur from any accident, regardless of speed, and from only a
minimal amount of impact to one's head. Moreover, during the "buckle up
for safety" seat belt campaign, the public was inundated with national
statistics concerning the frequency of accidents within a short distance of
one's residence. At the very least, if reasonable minds can differ on this,
then the trier of fact is entitled to make the determination.
One final point with respect to the imposition of a duty on P is the
interest of society in P's well-being. A United States District Court,
which addressed the constitutionality of Massachussetts' helmet statute,
aptly stated the economic impact of a helmetless cyclist on society:
[W]e cannot agree that the consequences of the injuries of a helmetless cyclist
are limited to the individual who sustains the injury. . . . From the moment
of the injury, society picks the person up off the highway; delivers him to a
municipal hospital and municipal doctors; provides him with unemployment
compensation if, after recovery, he cannot replace his lost job, and, if the
injury causes permanent disability, may assume the responsibility for his and
his family's continued subsistence. We do not understand a state of mind that
permits plaintiff to think that only he himself is concerned. 0 3
Under Prosser's formulation, these considerations must be balanced
against the social utility of P's conduct of riding a motorcycle without a
helmet. The strongest argument P can make is that the interest he seeks to
protect is the constitutional "freedom of choice" discussed earlier. Such an
argument may have impact, as indeed it has upon state legislators, when
competing against the implementation of federal restraints; the argument
loses substance, however, the moment it leaves the sphere of governmental
restraints and enters into the arena of civil liability. The removal of federal
and state mandates on P does not also remove his duty to protect himself
through reasonable means when a reasonable person would do so. One's
freedom of choice is an honorable American tenet, but when one exercises
this right in a manner other than that of a reasonable person one will be
required to accept consequences of his actions.
Finally, the burden being placed on P in taking the necessary
102. Id.
103. Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277,279 (D. Mass. 1972), a'ffdmem., 409 U.S. 1020(1972).
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precautions to avoid his injury is very minimal. He is only being asked to
wear a helmet, which takes little time and effort, is not inconvenient,
imposes insignificant costs, and presents no additional hazard.
0 4
It should be noted that most of the helmet-use statistics available
indicate that in the states that have repealed their helmet laws, a substantial
majority of cyclists still wear their helmets. 5 This differs drastically from
the seat belt-use statistics, which indicate that as few as one-third of the
motoring public wear seat belts. 10 6 Undoubtedly, this discrepancy is
partially due to the motorcycling public's general awareness of the
possibility of highway accidents, the severe consequences that can result
from them, and the recognition of motorcycle helmets as a proven safety
device in reducing the risk of serious injury and death. If P, through
laziness, neglect, or sheer refusal, decides not to wear his helmet, D and
society in general cannot be asked to "cover" for his autonomous and
incorrect decision.
It becomes clear, in reviewing the respective weights of the interests
asserted in this context, that the scales of justice are tipped in favor of
imposing a duty on the plaintiff-cyclist to wear a helmet for his own
,protection. However, the imposition of this duty in a civil context will
undoubtedly incite cyclists and their counsel to renew the objections made
earlier in the state legislatures.
It will likely be argued, in response to defense counsel's arguments
concerning the existence of a duty, that the repeal of the statute imposing
criminal penalties for failure to wear a helmet represents the considered
judgment of the legislature that cyclists ought not be expected, or required,
to wear a helmet while riding. That decision, it will be argued, is a matter of
policy and should not be second-guessed by the courts.
It is up to defense counsel to clarify the issues for the court. It should
be emphasized that the death of helmet laws was attributable to the
legislative acceptance of the "freedom of choice" arguments of the statute's
opponentsl°7 -arguments which are properly considered in the above
described balancing test.'0 8 It is more appropriate, it should be argued, to
consider the repeal as a removal of coercive criminal penalties that had
104. See note 25 supra.
105. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
106. See Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977), in which the court stated:
"[W]hile not controlling as to the standard of conduct, it is a fact and persuasive that the majority of
motorists do not habitually use their seat belts. Studies show that as many as two-thirds of observed
drivers did not use seat belts." Id. at 133, 570 P.2d at 143. See also Note, Seat Belt Negligence in
Automobile Accidents, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 288, 289 ("The social utility of wearing a seat belt must be
established in the mind of the public before failure to use a seat belt can be held to be negligence.")
107. Those familiar with the repeal of Ohio's helmet statute readily admit that the "freedom of
choice" issue was the primary impetus for the repeal. Interview with Mr. George Jupinko, legal
counsel, Ohio Department of Highway Safety, in Columbus, Ohio (Oct. 2, 1978); interview with Mr.
Herbert Knox, supra note 100. In addition, probably the most active opponent of the helmet statutes
was the American Motorcycle Association (AMA), which, while strongly asserting the "right to
choose," continued to counsel its members to wear protective helmets. See note 34 supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 103-04 supra.
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previously been imposed on persons now recognized to be of sufficient age
and wisdom to take care of themselves. 0 9 It should be noted that most
states that have repealed their helmet statutes have retained the
requirements for minors or novices."o Viewed in this light, the removal of
the statutory standard of conduct expected of a motorcyclist does not lead
to the removal of the common-law standard of conduct to which a
reasonable motorcyclist will be held."' This is perhaps best illustrated by
the 1977 amendments to the Minnesota helmet statute."
t 2
One final note with respect to the repeal movement-it is possible that
not only has its pace been slowed, it appears to be backpedaling in some
quarters. On the national level, national highway officials are lobbying
Congress to allow re-imposition of the federal mandates." 3 On the state
level, some legislatures that fell prey to the "freedom of choice" arguments
are beginning to wonder whether perhaps that freedom has come at too
great a cost.
14
2. The Problem of Causation
Once defense counsel successfully establishes that P had a duty to
wear a helmet at the time of the accident, and that P breached that duty, a
causal relationship between that breach and P's injuries must be
established. This will present counsel with both practical and theoretical
hurdles that must be cleared in his effort to establish the "helmet defense"
under the contributory negligence theory-regardless of whether the duty
is established under the per se rules or the common law.
From a theoretical standpoint, Holland illustrates the difficulty
counsel faces in attempting to satisfy the causation requirement. Even if
counsel can demonstrate that P's failure to wear a helmet caused all or a
portion of the claimed injuries, the court might dismiss the argument since
P's breach was not the cause of the accident. From a practical standpoint,
counsel will never reach the theoretical hurdle if he is unable to separate
those injuries P suffered as a result of the accident, or initial collision, from
those sustained as a result of his failing to wear protective headgear. An
109. In fact, in Ohio a bill was considered, though never introduced, that was quite similar to
Minnesota's statutory "helmet defense." Notes in file of Rep. Terry Tranter of Ohio; interview with Mr.
Herbert Knox, supra note 100.
110. See notes 39-43 supra.
I 1l. Note that it is well settled that compliance with a statute is not conclusive evidence of a
proper exercise of care. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965) ("Compliance with a
legislative enactment . . . does not prevent a finding of negligence where a reasonable man would
take additional precautions.").
112. See note 68 supra.
113. Interview with Georgia Jupinko, supra note 78.
114. For example, on Feb. 14, 1979, Rep. Frank Mahnic introduced H.B. 244 in the Ohio
General Assembly. The bill, which apparently died in committee, would have re-imposed the helmet-
use requirements on all cyclists in the state. Interview with Diane Kuhlman, Research Associate, Ohio
Legislative Service Commission, in Columbus, Ohio (April 20, 1979).
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additional requirement, of course, is that counsel be able to prove that
relationship.
a. Practical Underpinnings in Asserting a Causal Relationship
If defense counsel plans to assert the "motorcycle helmet defense," a
causal relationship between the plaintiff's nonuse of a helmet and all or a
portion of his subsequent injuries must be pleaded and proved. The
Holland court noted this in stating that a jury would not be entitled to
apportion damages "unless expert or other testimony were presented from
which it can properly infer that some or all of . . . [plaintiff's]
injuries . . . would not have occurred had the helmet been worn."'15 The
"seat belt defense" cases also support the proposition that without
sufficient evidence allowing a jury to infer the existence of a causal
relationship, the court will rule in favor of the plaintiff."16 As one legal
commentator addressing the "seat belt defense" succinctly stated: "It is
crystal clear, that competent and convincing evidence of a causal
connection between nonuse and the injuries and damages sustained is
imperative: The life blood of a legal theory is facts and if there are no facts
supporting the theory, it is error to instruct on that theory.""90
7
Consequently, counsel must gather sufficient evidence to establish the
amount of injuries that came to the plaintiff as a result of his failing to wear
a helmet." 8 Again, a case similar to the hypothetical would pose no real
problems, but in close cases it does not automatically follow that simply
because plaintiff fails to wear a helmet, his total injuries are capable of
separation and defendant will thus be able to assert the "helmet defense"
with success. Also, it does not automatically follow from the separability
of the injuries that a court will accept counsel's causation arguments.
b. Theoretical Considerations- The Accident/Injury
Causation Distinction
Even if defense counsel is successful in imposing a duty on Pto wear a
protective helmet, and is successful in separating P's injuries, the asserted
"helmet defense" may run aground due to the traditional effect of the
doctrine of contributory negligence and to the particular causation
problems inherent in the factual circumstances of a helmet case.
115. Dean v. Holland, 76 Misc. 2d 517, 518, 350 N.Y.S.2d 859, 861-62 (1973).
116. See, e.g., Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 379, 149 N.W.2d 626, 641 (1976):
The record supports the trial court's determination that there was no proof whatsoever to
show that [plaintiff's] injuries were caused oraggravated by the failure to use the seat belts. In
the absence of credible evidence by one qualified to express the opinion of how the use or
nonuse of seat belts would have affected the particular injuries, it is improper for the court to
permit the jury to speculate on the effect that seat belts would have had.
For an excellent article concerning the prerequisite of a causal connection for the seat belt defense, see
Fisher, The Medical and Legal Problems Arising from the Failure to Wear Seat Belts, 27 UNIV.
MIAMI L. REV. 130, 146 (1972). See also Bowman, Practical Defense Problems- The Trial LawI'er's
View, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 191 (1970); Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 1033, 1050 (1977).
117. Kircher, supra note 53, at 190.
118. See, e.g., note 50 supra.
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Dean Prosser notes that even after a court determines that a statutory
violation is negligence per se, "[t]here will still remain open such questions
as the causal relation between the violation and the harm to the
plaintiff. ...""9 A literal reading of Dean Prosser's point would
seemingly raise no problem since a causal relationship does exist between
the nonuse of a helmet and the resulting harm to the plaintiff. However,
because of the accident/ injury causation problem, a court might reason
that regardless of the harm resulting from plaintiff's conduct, that conduct
was not the cause of the initial accident. Consequently, it is critical for
counsel to anticipate such a possibility and recognize that the court may,
on that basis, discard the contributory negligence assertion entirely, rather
than recognize its applicability to the reduction of plaintiff's damages. To
illustrate, the reader is asked at this time to recall the facts of the earlier
posited hypothetical, and to focus on the following examples.
In a typical contributory negligence situation, the plaintiff (P) and the
defendant (D) both create the harmful situation and bring about P's
injuries. For example, if P as a pedestrian carelessly walks out into moving
traffic and is subsequently struck by a careless motorist, D, the causation
may be illustrated by the following diagram:
D Z (Plaintiff's injuries)
P
It can be said in this instance that both P and D caused (indicated by
solid arrows) the accident and P's injuries in the amount of Z. In the
jurisdictions that recognize contributory negligence, as opposed to
comparative negligence,1 20 the operational effect of the doctrine of
contributory negligence usually acts as a complete defense for a defendant,
totally barring a plaintiff's claim for recovery. The "all-or-nothing" effect
of the doctrine may be a just result in this instance since P's negligence
brought about both the accident and injuries to him.
In a "helmet defense" case, however, the factual circumstances are
distinguishable and give rise to more difficult causation problems. For
example, P and D's conduct in the hypothetical may be illustrated by the
following:
D -X (P's injuries resultingfrom initial collision)
" '(P's totalinjuries)
14, (P's injuries resulting
P 0 Y from nonuse of helmet)
119. PROSSER, supra note 56, § 36, at 200-01. This language is contained in the discussion of
negligence per se, but Prosser later notes that the "accepted rule" concerning a statutory violation-by a
plaintiff "is to stand on the same footing as a violation by the defendant." Id. at 203.
120. See text accompanying notes 151-55 infra.
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In this instance, it can be said that D solely caused (indicated by solid
arrow) Xamount of P's total injuries, Z, as a result of causing the accident
and colliding with P in the first place. Also, based on the traditional "thin
skull rule" 121 of negligence theory, whereby a defendant takes his plaintiff
as he finds him, D can be said to have caused (indicated by dotted arrow) Y
amount of P's total injuries. Notwithstanding this traditional notion,
however, the fact remains that Y amount of P's total injuries was also
caused (indicated by solid arrow) by P himself in failing to wear a
protective helmet. Thus, the factual circumstances create an accident/in-
jury causation distinction.1 22 It is this distinction that will plague counsel
for the remainder of the trial, and he must be careful to keep the court in-
formed on the intricacies of the theory and its basis in fairness and reason.
One question that must be confronted early in the case is whether to
attempt to secure a total bar to P's claim or merely reduce his recovery.
Because of the "all-or-nothing" effect of contributory negligence, counsel
might meet with resistance from the court to the doctrine's application in
this context, especially when D does not deny causing the accident.
1 23
While a total bar should not be discounted without consideration it is
clear that arguments for a total bar to recovery in these cases are not for
the meek. First, not only is the "helmet defense" without any legal au-
thority justifying a total bar, such authority is lacking in the "seat belt"
cases as well.
24
121. PROSSER, supra note 56, § 43, at 260-63. One court relied on the "thin skull rule" in rejecting
a "seat belt defense," stating: "[O]nce the element of injury proximately caused by the defendant's
negligence is introduced, it is traditional that the defendant take the plaintiff as he finds him . .. ."
Lipsomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914,918 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967). See also Fischerv. Moore, 183 Colo.
392, 393, 517 P.2d 458, 459 (1974); Kleist, The Seat Belt Defense-An Exercise in Sophistry, 18
HASTINGS L.J. 613, 616 (1967).
122. This distinction was also recognized in Remington v. Arndt, 28 Conn. Supp. 289,259 A.2d
145 (Super. Ct. 1969), a seat belt case in which plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile driven by
defendant Arndt that collided with a second defendant motorist. Answering plaintiff's complaint for
personal injuries, the second defendant asserted a "seat belt defense." The court, on plaintiff's
demurrer, stated:
It is . . . obvious that the defendant cannot claim that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent in the sense that his conduct was a contributing cause of the collision between the
Arndt vehicle and the defendant's vehicle. The defendant's claim is, rather, that the plaintiff's
conduct caused the plaintiff to sustain injuries which he would not have sustained if he had
fastened his seat belt. The distinction between these two phases of a plaintiff's alleged
negligence has been long recognized in this state.
Id. at 291, 259 A.2d at 145-46. The court continued, quoting from another Connecticut case:
To . . . [defeat the action] it must be an act or omission which contributes to the happening
of the act or event which caused the injury. An act or omission that merely increases or adds to
the extent of the loss or injury will not have that effect, though, of course, it may affect the
amount of damages recovered in a given case.
Id. at 291, 259 A.2d at 146 (brackets in original), quoting Smithwick v. Hall & Upsom Co., 59 Conn.
261, 271, 21 A. 924, 925 (1890).
123. The court's reluctance may be cured (if a total bar is not being sought, see notes 125-27 and
accompanying text infra), by citing it to the damage apportionment rules, discussed at notes 137-50 and
accompanying text infra.
124. At least one commentator has cited General Motors Corp. v. Walden, 406 F.2d 606 (10th
Cir. 1969), as authority for a total bar. Kircher, supra note 53, at 177. That proposition is arguable at
best. The court affirmed a lower court's instructions to the jury stating that if the decedent was found
negligent in not using his seat belt and in driving while under the influence of alcohol and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and death that they must find against the plaintiff.
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A total bar should, nonetheless, be sought in appropriate cir-
cumstances. For example, although nearly inconceivable, a motorcyclist's
failure to wear a helmet might be a contributing cause of an accident or
initial collision. 125 This would effectively turn the factual circumstances
into an ordinary contributory negligence situation, illustrated by the first
diagram, thereby destroying the accident/injury distinction.
More importantly, it is possible that an accident between a motorist
and a motorcyclist could occur in a manner similar to the hypothetical.
Thus, the initial impact between P and D would have left P relatively
unharmed if P had been wearing a helmet; however, because he did not, all
of his injuries came as a result of the "second collision."'' 26 Therefore, even
if the bar initially sought by defense counsel is partial in form, it might turn
out to be total in substance. Such a factual occurrence is possible given that
a minimal impact to one's head can account for substantial injuries.
Nonetheless, it remains highly improbable that no injuries would come
about from an initial collision between an automobile and a motorcycle.
Finally, defense counsel may be in a jurisdiction that strictly applies
the contributory negligence doctrine in all situations. In other words, it
may be possible that once a court allows the "helmet defense" to be
asserted under the contributory negligence theory, it may strictly adhere to
its operative effect as a complete defense and ignore the accident/ injury
causation distinction. A rationale for this is couched in the commonly cited
definition of contributory negligence, which literally reads that the
plaintiff's failure to use ordinary care to protect himself is causally
connected to the harm or injury sustained rather than to the accident.127
125. The court in State v. Craig, 19 Ohio App. 2d 29, 249 N.E.2d 75 (1969), saw this as a
constitutional justification for the enactment of helmet laws. See note 28 supra.
126. "Second collision" cases, by illustration, involve two motor vehicles initially colliding and
subsequently causing a "second collision" between the occupant of one vehicle and the inside of the
vehicle itself. Several "second collision" cases have also recognized an accident/injury distinction. For
example, in Bolm v. Triumph Corporation, 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769 (1973), a plaintiff-
motorcyclist brought a products liability suit against the defendant-manufacturer of the motorcycle.
Plaintiff claimed that the motorcycle was defectively designed by the placement of a parcel grid on the
motorcycle directly in front of the rider. Plaintiff was in a collision with another motorist and he
claimed that although the defective design did not cause the accident, it aggravated and contributed to
his injuries. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of the
traditional second collision rule which refuses to extend liability to the manufacturer when 'the
defective design did not cause the accident. The appellate division reversed and the court of appeals
affirmed. The defendant was permitted to separate those damages caused by the initial impact from
those of the second collision between the plaintiff and his motor vehicle, thus illustrating the court's
willingness to extend liability to the manufacturer for those injuries caused by the defective design but
not for the entire amount when such a defective design had no causal relationship to the happening of
the accident.
Cf. Note, Seat Belt Negligence in Automobile Accidents, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 288, 298: "The easy
case [of whether the non-use of seat belts produced the injuries] . . . is where the plaintiff's head
moves forward and strikes the windshield during the accident, with little or no damage to the car or to
other parts of the plaintiff's body."
Courts have not referred to a helmet case as a form ofa"second collision" case; however, not only
is the situation analogous but counsel might draw upon the "second collision" label to strengthen the
argument that a court entertaining a helmet case should at least follow the causation reasoning in
"second collision" cases and thus allow a partial bar with the helmet defense as opposed to disallowing
the defense at all.
127. See Prosser, supra note 56, § 65, at 416-17; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965),
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It is suggested that defense counsel keep the possibility of a total bar in
mind, but in order to increase the chances for successfully asserting the
"motorcycle helmet defense" it is critical for counsel to recognize the need
to plead alternatively in such a fashion as to assert a partial bar to a
plaintiff's personal injury claims. As Holland indicates, counsel can and
should use the accident/injury distinction to his advantage. It is clear that
the Holland court was troubled by the accident/injury causation problem;
in fact, although it is not clear from the opinion, this concern apparently
led the court to dismiss the contributory negligence theory entirely,
refusing to bar totally the plaintiff's recovery. 128 The court was willing,
however, to allow the "helmet defense" under some other mitigation
theory. The jury was to be allowed to impose a partial bar, apportioning
the damages between the parties based on a determination of the Yamount
of the plaintiff's total injuries, Z, caused by his negligent failure to wear a
helmet.
129
Because the Holland court's analysis in resolving the accident/ injury
causation problem was scant, and without going beyond the scope of this
article by handling the complexities of the causation requirements of the
negligence doctrine, a few points merit discussion for defense counsel.
The causation analysis of any negligence claim is generally thought to
operate in two phases: actual causation, or causation in fact, and
proximate causation. With regard to the actual causation analysis, Dean
Prosser alludes to the "but for" test 30 in determining whether one's
negligent conduct was the actual cause of the harm. Framed in terms of the
hypothetical and from defense counsel's standpoint, it might be said that P
would not have sustained Y amount of his total injuries, Z, but for the fact
he did not wear his protective helmet. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
incorporates a broader test, commonly referred to as the "substantial
factor" test, 131 which would find negligent conduct as the legal cause of the
harm if it was a substantial factor in bringing it about.
Consequently, assuming counsel can substantiate the causal
relationship between P's helmetless conduct and his subsequent injuries,
the first phase of the causation requirement can be satisfied. As depicted
earlier, 11 counsel can simply explain the mechanics of who actually caused
what. The. argument might be as follows: Although D, through the
negligent operation of his automobile, actually caused the initial accident,
it was P who actually caused all or a substantial portion of the injuries
through his negligence in riding without a protective helmet. Framed in
reproduced in pertinent part in note 74 infra. See also text accompanying notes 132-36 infra, dis-
cussing the problem of causation.
128. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
129. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
130. PROSSER, supra note 56, at 238-39.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1965).
132. See text accompanying notes 120-21 supra.
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these terms, it is easier for a court to comprehend the accident/ injury
distinction as an appropriate basis for applying the "helmet defense" as a
partial bar.
The second phase of the causation requirement, concerning
proximate causation, can also be met by defense counsel. The proximate
cause analysis has been a legal can of worms for courts and practicing
attorneys. Dean Prosser states that it involves "merely the limitation which
the courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences
of his conduct."'' 3 In addition, the analysis involves the troublesome issue
of "intervening factors" and whether a particular intervening factor
constitutes a "superseding cause" so as to preclude the liability of the
actor. 3 4 In this situation, due to the accident/injury distinction, the
analysis might proceed along two lines.
First, from the standpoint of D, counsel might argue that P's
helmetless conduct constitutes an intervening factor and a superseding
cause of the resulting consequences, which D could not be expected to
foresee. Thus, it effectively cuts off D's original responsibility for causing
that portion of P's harm caused by P's failing to wear a helmet. Dean
Prosser discusses the issue as being "one of whether the defendant is to be
held liable for injury to which he has in fact made a substantial
contribution, when it is brought about by a later cause of independent
origin, for which he is not responsible."'
' 35
Second, from P's standpoint, counsel should recall the earlier
discussion concerning the imposition of a duty on P to wear a helmet in the
first place. Counsel might argue that because it is reasonably foreseeable by
P that harm would come to him as a result of his being helmetless and
becoming involved in an accident, such conduct by P can be said to be the
proximate cause of his harm or injuries. In other words, the negligence of
D in causing the collision is not a superseding cause of P's contributory
negligence in causing the harm, because a reasonable cyclist would easily
foresee that a negligent driver might collide with him and that the absence
of a helmet would cause or aggravate the injuries.
Counsel should note that although it is not clear that the Holland
court proceeded in such a deliberate two phase analysis in order to
reconcile the accident/injury causation problem, the court did use
proximate cause language in reaching its finding. 3 6 Consequently, it is
133. PROSSER, supra note 56, § 41, at 236.
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 441 (1965) defines an intervening force as "one which
actively operates in producing harm to another after the actor's negligent act or omission has been
committed." Under the Restatement, if an intervening cause is determined to be a superseding cause
(this determination established according to the rules in §§ 442-453), it relieves the defendant from
liability "irrespective of whether his antecedent negligence was or was not a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm." Id. § 440, comment b. Section 440 defines a superseding cause as an "act of a
third person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to
another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing it about."
135. PROSSER, supra note 56, § 44, at 270.
136. See notes 64, 65 and accompanying text supra. See also Street v. Cavert, 541 S.W.2d 576
1980]
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
suggested that 'regardless of the complexities of the causation re-
quirements, counsel's use of the deliberate two phase analysis outlined
above should facilitate a court's seeing that as a matter of fairness and
equity, a jury should be entitled to apportion the damages between P and
D based on their finding the amount of damages each caused. Therefore, D
would be required to recompense P for the amount of injuries D caused by
initially colliding with P, and not compensate him for those injuries P
caused himself as a result of his negligent conduct.
3. Applying the Damage Apportionment Rules
Counsel's success in asserting the "helmet defense" under the
contributory negligence theories, and seeking a partial bar to plaintiff's
recovery, may be contingent upon his ability to persuade the court to apply
the damage apportionment rules set forth in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.'37 Otherwise, as previously mentioned, a court's grappling with the
accident/injury causation problem, inherent in helmet cases, and the
operative effect of the "all-or-nothing" rule, may lead to a dismissal of the
"helmet defense" under the contributory negligence theories rather than
the application of the damages apportionment rules so as to reduce the
plaintiff-cyclist's recovery.'38
This matter might quickly be resolved if counsel is within a state
having an apportionment statute or its common-law equivalent in effect.
But in the absence of either, counsel should argue in accordance with the
Restatement (Second) of Torts sections concerning apportionment.
First, section 433A provides that
[d]amages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where
(a) there are distinct harms. .. .
(Tenn. 1976), in which the Supreme Court of Tennessee allowed the "seat belt defense" to be asserted
under the doctrine of "remote contributory negligence." The court defined that term as "that negligence
which is too far removed as to the time or place, or causative force, to be a direct or proximate cause of
the accident." Id. at 585. The court then suggested an appropriate jury charge: "If you find the plaintiff
guilty of such remote contributory negligence, you must reduce the recovery which you would
otherwise award, in proportion to plaintiffs contribution to the injury." Id.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 433A (1965). See text accompanying notes 139-44 infra.
138. See Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 82, at 10:
Both the contributory negligence and avoidable consequences doctrines are judicially
created. Yet many courts, engaging in classic examples of "pigeonhole jurisprudence," have
declined to fill the void left by the two concepts by inferring a duty to avoid the consequences
of an accident before its occurrence ...
S. ./T/he tacit recognition of the inequities involved in the rejection of [these two
doctrines] has led many jurisdictions to adopt a damage apportionment technique.
Apportionment of damages is, in effect, the judicial merger of the doctrines of contributory
negligence and avoidable consequences whereby evidence of [nonusage] . ..may be
considered to diminish a damage recovery.
The authors then indicate that there is a growing number of jurisdictions allowing "diminution of
damages because of a party's failure to fasten [a] ... seat belt .... Id. at 10 n.33. See, e.g., Mays
v. Dealers Transit, Inc., 441 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1971) (applying Indiana law); Gloverv. Daniels, 310 F.
Supp. 750 (N.D. Miss. 1970); Noth v. Scheurer, 285 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Truman v. Vargas,
275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969); Uresky v. Fedora, 27 Conn. Supp. 498,245 A.2d 393
(1968); Josel v. Rossi, 7 Il. App. 3d 1091, 288 N.E.2d 677 (1972).
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965).
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Comment a to this section further elaborates that
[t]he rules [in 433A] apply whenever two or more causes have combined to
bring about harm to the plaintiff, and each has been a substantial fac-
tort' 0] in producing the harm.
14 1
Then, comment f, entitled "contributory negligence," states that
apportionment may be made between the plaintiff and the defendant when
the plaintiff himself is at fault.'
42
Finally, comment c to section 46514 provides that
[s]uch apportionment may also be made where the antecedent negligence of
the plaintiff is found not to contribute in any way to the original accident or
injury, but to be a substantial contributing factor in increasing the harm
which ensues.
44
These rules should equip counsel with some strong ammunition for
successfully establishing the "helmet defense" under the contributory
negligence theories in order to achieve a partial bar to plaintiff's claim. A
court must be made aware of the fact that such an application of the
damage apportionment rules would lead to a more fair and equitable
result. It should be argued that P would still be entitled to the portion of
damages D actually caused by initially colliding with P. Moreover, D still
has the difficult burden of proving what, if any, percentage of the damages
occurred as a result of P's failing to wear his protective helmet. 145 If, in the
140. The "substantial factor" test is stated in Restatement §§ 431 and 433. Under § 431 one's
negligence is a "legal cause" of the harm "if his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about
the harm .. " Section 433 discusses the factors in determining the element of substantiality.
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A, comment a (1965).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A, comment f (1965). This is illustrated as follows:
Through the negligence of A, B, and C, water escapes from irrigation ditches on their
land, and floods a part of C's farm. There is evidence that 50 per cent of the water came from
A's ditch, 30 per cent from B's ditch, and 20 per cent from C's. On the basis of this evidence, A
may be held liable for 50 per cent of the damages to C's farm,and B liable for 30 per cent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A, Illustration 9 (1965).
143. Causal Relation Between Harm and Plaintiff's Negligence
(1) The plaintiff's negligence is a legally contributing cause of his harm if, but only if, it
is a substantial factor in bringing about his harm and there is no rule restricting his
responsibility for it.
(2) The rules which determine the causal relation between the plaintiff's negligent
conduct and the harm resulting to him are the same as those determining the causal relation
between the defendant's negligent conduct and resulting harm to others.
RESTATEIENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 465 (1965).
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 465, comment c (1965), citing, inter alia, Hamilton v.
Boyd, 218 Iowa 885,256 N.W. 290, (1934); Wright v. II.-Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866); O'Keefev.
Kansas City W. R. Co., 87 Kan. 322, 124 P. 416 (1912); Guile v. Greenberg, 192 Minn. 548,257 N.W.
649 (1934); Gould v. McKenna, 86 Pa. 297, 27 Am. Rep. 705 (1878).
145. D's burden of production might be governed by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B
(1965), which provides in part:
(2) Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about
harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground
that the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to the
apportionment among them is upon each such actor.
The comments indicate that "Subsection (2) states an exception to the general rule stated in Subsection
(I). It arises where the tortious conduct of two or more actors combines to bring about harm to the
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eyes of the jury, D's evidence does not preponderate on this issue, P
prevails.
Many courts and commentators have objected to a jury's appor-
tioning the damages either because it allows for widespread jury
speculation, 146 or because it is too akin to comparative negligence. 147 In the
seat belt case of Spier v. Barker,148 the New York Court of Appeals
explained why the speculation claim was unjustified:
In addition to underestimating the abilities of those trained in the field of
accident reconstruction, this argument fails to consider other instances in
which the jury is permitted to apportion damages (i.e., as between an original
tort-feasor and a physician who negligently treats the original injury).
Furthermore, if the defendant is unable to show that the seat belt would have
prevented some of the plaintiff's injuries, then the trial court ought not submit
the issue to the jury.' 9
And, as one legal commentator has asserted with regard to apportioning
damages in "seat belt defense" cases: "Although the cry of 'speculation'
may be well founded in some cases, 'even an unsophisticated apportion-
ment would in all likelihood, be superior to the . . . fiat rule allowing' or
denying full recovery."'
150
4. Comparative Negligence Jurisdictions
Up to this point, this article has been for the benefit of defense counsel
in jurisdictions adhering to the doctrine of contributory negligence, rather
than comparative negligence. Because the number of comparative
negligence jurisdictions is growing,' 5' however, and because the "helmet
plaintiff, and the harm which results is capable of apportionment among the causes producing it, as
stated in § 433A (1), and the Comments to that Section." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B,
comment c (1965).
146. In Rogers v. Frush, 257 Md. 233,262 A.2d 549 (1970), the court said that"the complicated
task of damage apportionment would 'invite verdicts in prejudice and sympathy contrary to the law,'
create 'unnecessary conflicts in result,' and 'degrade the law by reducing it to a game of chance.'" Id. at
239, 262 A.2d at 553, quoting Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914, 917 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967).
147. There is, however, an important distinction between the two doctrines. See text
accompanying note 154 infra.
148. 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974).
149. Id. at 452-53, 323 N.E.2d at 169. See also Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 569 F.2d 754,771 (3d
Cir. 1977) (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting):
I am not persuaded by the objection that acceptance of seat belt testimony by ajury will
require speculation on the proper amount of damages. It is naive indeed to say that the law
does not permit juries to speculate on damages when daily they are asked to determine the
value of future pain and suffering. There are few things more uncertain in this world than the
length of a particular person's life, yet juries regularly determine damages in death cases.
Indeed, in this very case that problem was submitted to thejury. Damage apportionment in a
seat belt case would not be more conjectural.
The jury should have been permitted to consider the evidence of seat belts as bearing on
mitigation of damages. I would place the burden on the defendant to prove the elements of
mitigation but would not bar the jury from considering this valuable evidence.
150. Recent Developments, 3 HOFSTRA L. R. 883, 887 (1975), quoting Prosser, Comparative
Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 476 (1953).
151. Thirty-two states have replaced contributory negligence with some form of comparative
negligence. The following traces the growth:
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defense" is still applicable in such jurisdictions, a few issues merit brief
discussion.
With regard to the "seat belt defense" it has been suggested t52 that the
application of comparative negligence rules obviates the need for counsel
to assert the "defense;"' 53 and, at first glance, this appears to be the case
since comparative negligence operates to trigger automatically the
apportioning of damages between the parties. There is a subtle and
important distinction, however, between damage apportioning under
comparative negligence and damage apportioning under a partial bar
theory of the "seat belt" or "helmet defense." Under the rules of
comparative negligence, ajury apportions the damages based on the fault
of each party, while under the "seat belt" or "helmet defense" and the
accompanying damage apportion rules, the damages are apportioned
1950-Ga.; Miss.; Neb.; S.D.; Wisc.
1957-Arkansas
1965-Maine
1969-Hawaii; Mass.; Minn.; N.H.
1970-Vermont
1971-Colo.; Idaho; Oregon; R.I.
1973-Conn.; Nevada; N.J.; N.D.; Okla.; Tex.; Utah; Wash.; Wyo.; Fla. (by the S. Ct.)
1974-Kansas
1975-Mont.; N.Y.; Pa.; Calif. (S. Ct.); Alaska (S. Ct.)
V. SCHVARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE (1974).
There are a variety of comparative negligence systems. For instance, in the "pure' comparative
negligence jurisdictions, the negligence of plaintiff and defendant are compared and the damages are
apportioned accordingly. There are some jurisdictions where a plaintiff's negligence must be less than
the defendant's in order for the plaintiff to recover, and other jurisdictions where the plaintiff will
recover if his negligence is not greater than the defendant's. Finally, there are a fewjurisdictions where a
plaintiff will recover only if his negligence is slight compared to the gross negligence of the defendant.
PROSSER, supra note 56, § 67, at 436-37.
152. The same suggestions might also be made with regard to the "helmet defense," even though
such a suggestion was not made in the helmet cases. When the Rogers and Holland decisions were
handed down, Maryland and New York, respectively, were without comparative negligence. TheNew
York Legislature shortly thereafter enacted comparative negligence while Maryland stilladheres to the
contributory negligence doctrine. When the Fox case was decided, Minnesota did have comparative
negligence; however, since the helmet defense was rejected, the court never acknowledged the issue.
153. Spier v. Barker, 42 App. Div. 2d 248, 348 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1974). The appellate division,
affirming a trial court's rejection of the "seat belt defense," stated:
[he effect of the charge relating to the doctrine of avoidable consequences would have been
error if the issue of liability had been resolved in favor of plaintiff. Under the terms of the
charge on this issue, the ensuing damages would have to be apportioned on the basis of how
much or to what extent these damages were due to the accident, the impact itself on the one
hand, or the failure to use the available seat belt on the other. To permit a jury to apportion
damages on this basis would permit the jury to engage in damages under comparative
negligence, which doctrine has not yet been accepted in New York.
Id. at 253,348 N.Y.S. 2d at 583. The New York Court of Appeals later reversed this position, 35 N.Y.2d
444, 323 N.E. 2d 164 (1974). See also Recent Developments, 3 HoFsrRA L.R. 883, 884 (1975).
In Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 569 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1977), the case arose out of a diversity action
and products liability suit against the defendant for a defective brake system. Defense counsel had
argued for the assertion of the "seat belt defense" under the doctrine of avoidable consequences so as to
reduce the plaintiff's recovery. The court affirmed the lower court's rejection of the "seat belt defense"
by stating at 765: "We therefore believe that evidence of non-usage cannot be admitted in Pennsylvania
under any general theory of comparative negligence." In note 7 to the opinion the court also said:
"Pennsylvania's new comparative negligence statute may well obviate the need so to alter (so as to
expand its application to pre-accident situations) the traditional avoidable consequences rules in many
cases (parentheses added)."
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based on what each party caused, regardless of the degree each may be at
fault. 154
It may be more appropriate to say, and indeed it has been suggested
with regard to the "seat belt defense," 55 that courts in comparative
negligence jurisdictions will be more willing to accept the "helmet defense"
since it would pertain to the issue of damage reduction and not to the issue
of liability.
B. The Doctrine of Avoidable Consequences
A second theory, other than contributory negligence, that has been
used rather frequently by defense attorneys in the "seat belt defense" cases
154. See Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 569 F.2d 754,769-70 (3d Cir. 1977) (Weis, J., concurring
and dissenting):
Comparative negligence appraises the factors which caused the impact, collision or similar
event and uses the relative degree of fault to reduce the damages. Mitigation or
apportionment of damages and avoidable consequences, on the other hand, are directed
toward activity (or nonaction) having a direct bearing on the extent of injury but not on the
conduct causing the litigated event. . . . The monetary result reached by apportioning
damages may be the same as in application of comparative negligence but the factors leading
there must be distinguished. By way of illustration it may be helpful to examine the results
which could occur in a routine intersection accident case in a state which applies comparative
negligence and also apportionment of damages. A jury might well determine that driver A
was ten percent at fault for failing to observe driver B going past a stop sign, and also that if
driver A had been wearing a seat belt, his damages would have been twenty percent less than
those actually sustained. Both factors would then be applied to reduce the amount
recoverable. Because the same result can be reached under comparative negligence without
concern over whether the plaintiff's conduct goes to liability or damages, there is a tendency
to blur the line between them. . . . The concepts of liability and damages are distinct and
must be kept so.
See also V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 276 (1974):
The process is not allocation of physical causation, which could be scientifically apportioned,
but rather of allocatingfault, which cannot be scientifically measured. For example, suppose
an intoxicated motorcyclist speeds at eighty miles an hour down a highway with a 55 mile
speed limit. He loses control of his vehicle and crosses over into the opposite lane where he
collides with a large truck traveling 65 miles per hour. The point of collision is the left fender
of the truck. As a result of the impact, the motorcyclist is killed and his vehicle is a total loss.
The truck, however, is only slightly damaged and the truckdriver is not hurt at all. . . . In
terms of pure physical causation, perhaps an expert could testify that the truck supplied 95%
of the force that killed the motorcyclist, based on formulae combining the relative weights,
speeds and directions of the vehicles. Even without expert assistance, the jurors might, by
instinct, regard the truck as the more substantial cause. Nevertheless, the jury's line of inquiry
under comparative negligence does not focus on physical causation; rather, it considers and
weighs culpability.
See also Hoglund & Parsons, supra note 82, at 18-25.
155. Kircher, supra note 53, at 188. Kircher cited three cases, Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362,
149 N.W.2d 626 (1967), Kelley v. United States, Civ. No. 4094 (S.D. Miss. 1967), Yvan v. Farstad, 62
W.W.R. (N.S.) 645 (B.C. 1967), from comparative negligence jurisdictions that "either applied the
(seat belt) defense to reduce damages or found that the defense could be applied in a proper case."
Kircher, supra, at 189. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 97 (1974):
When a state has a general system of comparative negligence, apportioning damages is much
easier in the seat-belt cases because the courts are accustomed to dealing with damage
apportionment between negligent plaintiffs and defendants. . . . This is not to say that any
state with comparative negligence will automatically adopt the seat-belt defense. The court
may believe that the defense should not be allowed because it sets too high a standard of
care . . . or that it is impossible to determine precisely how the wearing of a seat belt would
have mitigated damages. The point is that if a court thinks reasons of policy sponsor the
defense, it can more readily and easily apply it if its state has a general system of comparative
negligence.
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is the doctrine of avoidable consequences. 156 The doctrine's traditional
definition is:
Where one person has committed a tort, breach of contract, or other legal
wrong against another, it is incumbent upon the latter to use such means as
are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages.
The person wronged cannot recover for any item of damages which could
thus have been avoided.1
57
The doctrine's underlying rationale is to discourage "persons against
whom wrongs have been committed from passively suffering economic
loss which could have been averted by reasonable efforts ... .
Correspondingly, the doctrine operates to preclude the plaintiff from
recovering those damages that were reasonably capable of being avoided.
Because the doctrine is a rule of damages, it is essentially an application of
the damage apportionment rules mentioned above.' 59 However, most of
the courts and legal commentators considering the avoidable conse-
quences theory refer to it as a separate basis for the "seat belt defense."
Until the recent developments in seat belt cases, the avoidable
consequences theory could not be said to be an appropriate basis for the
"helmet defense" since inherent in the theory's definition is its traditional
application to post-accident situations in which the duty' 60 to avoid or
mitigate damages arises after the wrong has been committed by the
tortfeasor. The paradigmatic case is when a tortfeasor injures the plaintiff
and after the accident the plaintiff fails to seek medical treatment, thereby
increasing or aggravating his injury. 16' A court would apply the doctrine in
this situation to preclude the plaintiff from recovering for those injuries he
could have reasonably avoided.
The helmet and seat belt cases, however, pose a distinct problem by
creating a pre-accident factual situation, inconsistent with the traditional
post-accident application of the theory. In other words, a plaintiff-cyclist's
156. Many courts use the terms "avoidable consequence," "mitigation," "minimization,"
"diminution," "reduction," and "apportionment of damages" interchangeably.
157. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 33, at 127 (1935).
158. Id.
159. RESTATgMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A, comment f (1965) provides:
The damages rule as to avoidable consequences, stated in § 918, which denies recovery for the
aggravation of personal injuries or other harm resulting from the plaintiff's failure to use due
care to avoid it after the commission of the tort, frequently requires such apportionment, and
is merely an application of the rule.stated here.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 918(1) (1938) provides: "[A] person injuried by the tort of another is not en-
titled to recover damages for such harm as he could have avoided by the use of due care after the com-
mission of the tort." The tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states: "[O]ne injured
by the tort of another is not entitled to recover damages for such harm as he could have avoided by the
use of reasonable effort or expenditure after the commission of the tort." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 918(l) (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
160. McCormick suggests that this should not bethought of as a" 'duty' to avoid damages, but
rather ". . a 'disability' to recover for avoidable loss"-a "penalty." MCCORMICK, supra note 157,
§ 33, at 128.
161. E.g., Wingrove v. Home Land Co., 120 W. Va. 100, 196 S.E. 563 (1938).
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failure to wear a helmet comes before the defendant's negligence or the
accident. Therefore, the Rogers court, and many courts entertaining the
"seat belt defense,"' 162 have rejected the avoidable consequences theory by
reasoning that to place a duty on the plaintiff to wear his helmet before the
accident occurs essentially imposes a pre-accident obligation on him and
effectively denies his right to assume that others will exercise due care
towards him.
63
Based on the recent seat belt case of Spier v. Barker,164 however, the
trend of the courts has been to allow the assertion of the "seat belt defense"
under an expanded application of the avoidable consequences theory. 165 In
Spier, the plaintiff, as a result of colliding with defendant at an
intersection, was thrown from her automobile and subsequently pinned by
her vehicle when it rolled onto her legs. 166 At the trial court, defense
counsel attempted to introduce testimony showing that if plaintiff had
worn her seat belt she would not have been ejected from her vehicle, and
thus her injuries would not have been as severe.1 67 Although the appellate
division refused to allow counsel to assert the "seat belt defense" under the
avoidable consequences theory, 168 the New York Court of Appeals, on
review, found the theory to be an appropriate basis for the "defense."'
69
The Spier court discussed the theory's traditional application and
recognized that "the opportunity to mitigate damages prior to the
occurrence of an accident does not ordinarily arise."' 70 In rejecting what
the court felt was a "chronological distinction" applicable in most cases, it
opined that in this case "the seat belt affords the automobile occupant
an unusual and ordinarily unavailable means by which he or she may
minimize his or her damages prior to the accident."'
17
162. See, e.g., Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); Derheim v. N. Fiorito
Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030, 1035 (1972).
163. See note 52 supra.
164. 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164 (1974).
165. Courts and legal commentators have referred to application of the avoidable consequences
theory as being expanded. This might be misleading, since the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFToRTs refers
to the doctrine merely as an application of the basic damage apportion rule, see note 159 supra.
Therefore, the courts may be implicitly applying this basic damage rule instead of actually expanding
the traditional avoidable consequences theory.
166. 35 N.Y.2d at 446-47, 323 N.E.2d at 165-66.
167. Id. at 447-48, 323 N.E.2d at 166. Defense counsel proffered testimony of a professor of
mechanical and aerospace engineering who had extensive experience with the use of seat belts and was
willing to express his opinion as to their general effectiveness.
168. Spier v. Barker, 42 App. Div.2d 428, 348 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1974).
169. 35 N.Y.2d at 450-51, 323 N.E.2d at 167. The court said:
We today hold that non-use of an available seat belt, and expert testimony in regard thereto,
is a factor which the jury may consider, in light of all the other facts received in evidence, in
arriving at its determination as to whether the plaintiff has exercised due care, not only to
avoid injury to himself, but to mitigate any injury he would likely sustain.
The court refused to accept the other theories to the "seat belt defense."
170. Id. at 451-52, 323 N.E.2d at 168.
171. Id. (emphasis in original). See also Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 569 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1977),
in which the dissenting justice reasoned:
Simply because the correct pigeon hole for the legal theory is not immediately apparent does
[Vol. 41:233
1980] MOTORCYCLE HELMET DEFENSE
Other courts have adopted the Spier court's reasoning in allowing the
"seat belt defense" to be asserted under the avoidable consequences
theory,17 2 and based on this recent development, counsel should have
increasing success in establishing the "helmet defense." But to ensure such
success and guard against the possibility of a court's refusing to follow
Spier as a basis for the "helmet defense," counsel should reassert the
proposition that the avoidable consequences theory is simply a specific,
and not an exclusive, application of the Restatement's apportionment
rules. 73 In this manner, a court can be urged to reach the same equitable
ends through the more appropriate means discussed earlier.
C. Assumption of Risk
Of the possible theories set forth in this article, assumption of risk is
probably the weakest for defense counsel seeking to establish the
"motorcycle helmet defense." As defined, the assumption of risk theory
views a plaintiff's conduct as voluntarily encountering the known risk or
harm resulting from a defendant's negligence. 174 Consequently, the
plaintiff should be barred from recovering for the injuries sustained while
consciously exposing himself to such dangers. In the hypothetical, counsel
might argue that because P voluntarily chose not to wear his helmet, he
manifestly indicated that he was assuming the risks of injury in the event of
a collision.
On its face, the theory appears to fit nicely with the assertion of the
"helmet defense"; however, there are some significant difficulties in its
application. First, the doctrine is similar in some respects to contributory
negligence;' 75 therefore, if there is an overlap between the two available
not mean that critical evidence should be disregarded. Its relevance is apparent. The test
should be not when the challenged activity ornonactivity took place; rather, the focus should
be whether it played a part in producing the event or was unrelated to that event and affected
only the injury. The inquiry should not be chronological, but causal.
Id. at 771 (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting).
172. E.g., Pritts v. Walter Lowery Trucking Co., 400 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
173. See notes 159, 165, and text accompanying notes 139-44 supra.
174. Dean Prosser classifies the doctrine of assumption of risk into three broad situations:
In its simplest and primary sense, assumption of risk means that the plaintiff, in advance,
has given his consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to
take his chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave
undone ...
A second, and closely related situation, is where the plaintiffvoluntarily enters into some
relation with the defendant, with knowledge that the defendant will not protect him against
the risk. He may then be regarded as tacitly or impliedly consenting to the negligence, and
agreeing to take his own chances ...
In the third type of situation the plaintiff, aware of a risk already created by the
negligence of the defendant, proceeds voluntarily to encounter it. ...
PROSSER, supra note 56, § 68, at 440.
175. Dean Prosser distinguishes the two doctrines:
[The traditional basis has been that assumption of risk is a matter of knowledge of the
danger and intelligent acquiescence in it, while contributory negligence is a matter of some
fault or departure from the standard of conduct of a reasonable man, however unaware,
unwilling, or even protesting the plaintiff may be. Obviously the two may co-exist when the
plaintiff makes an unreasonable choice to incur the risk; but either may exist without the
other.
PROSSER. supra note 56, § 68, at 441. Dean Prosser points this out with a common example:
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theories, it is usually easier to assert contributory negligence than
assumption of risk since the former theory is based on the conduct of a
reasonable man while the latter entails a subjective element. 176
Second, as the definition indicates, counsel must demonstrate that P
knew, appreciated, and voluntarily encountered the risk. 177 Accordingly,
an inquiry must be made into the precise risk P voluntarily encountered
when he decided to ride helmetless. Although P undoubtedly risks some
dangers of the road, the theory requires that he knew the specific risk he
was encountering. While for purposes of contributory negligence P's
forseeability need only extend to the general hazards of cycling on high-
ways, assumption of risk would require P to appreciate and accept the
risk of a collision with D. Clearly Pdid not consciously accept and consent
to the negligence of D so as to relieve D of his duty to drive with care.
The most P can be said to consciously risk are the consequences of the
accident, and not the accident itself brought about by D's negligence. The
Rogers court, in rejecting counsel's assumption of risk argument, pointed
this out:
The doctrine . . . rests upon an intentional and voluntary exposure to a
known risk and, therefore, consent on the part of the plaintiff to relieve the
defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him and to take his chances
from the harm from a particular risk ...
Vastly increased traffic, if nothing more, means that an eastern shore of
Maryland resident who elects to shop in Baltimore City rather than in one of
the towns of the central portion of the Delmarva Peninsula is exposed to
greater risk of injury. A defendant in an action brought by such resident could
not raise assumption of risk, however, on the ground that once one ventured
across the Bay Bridge one assumed the consequences of that traffic, because
there would be no consent on the part of the plaintiff to relieve the defendant
of the consequences. . . . The conduct of young Frush here in riding a
motorcycle without a helmet, even if he had knowledge and appreciated the
risk, was not an act by which he relieved Mrs. Rogers of her obligation to
operate her vehicle in a careful and prudent manner . .178
The same reasoning has been applied by the courts in the seat belt cases.
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A pedestrian who walks across the street in the middle of a block, through a stream of traffic
traveling at high speed, cannot by any stretch of the imagination be found to consent that
drivers shall not use care to avoid running him down. On the contrary, he is insisting that they
shall. This is contributory negligence pure and simple; it is not assumption of risk.
Id. at 445.
176. E.g., the seat belt case of Pritts v. Walter Lowery Trucking Co., 400 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa.
1975), notes that similar considerations are within the assumption of risk defense as are present in
contributory negligence but the former is more difficult to establish since it requires the actor's
"deliberate participation in a known peril." Id. at 874 n.9.
177. PROSSER, supra note 56, at 447.
178. 257 Md. 233, 243-44, 262 A.2d 549, 554 (1970).
179. See Kleist, The Seat Belt Defense: An Excercise in Sophistry, supra note 121, at 620, in
which he argues that "it could hardly be said that when the plaintiff steps into his car he is relieving
defendant of the duty to drive carefully, or that the plaintiff is consenting to 'assume the risk' ofdefen-
dant's negligent manipulation of his automobile." See also Kleist, The Seat Belt Defense: A New
Approach, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 613 (1967); Comment, The Seat Belt Defense: A New Approach, 38
FORDHAM L. REv. 94 (1969); Woods v. Smith, 296 F. Supp. 1128, 1129 (N.D. Fla. 1969); Horn v. Gen-
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It is for these reasons that defense counsel will have insurmountable
difficulties urging a court to accept the "helmet defense" under the
assumption of risk theory. Instead, counsel should divert his efforts toward
the other theories.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It is inevitable that defense counsel can expect increasing oppor-
tunities to assert the "motorcycle helmet defense" in the future. In fact, it
should be only a matter of time before the "helmet defense" emerges with
full force commensurate with that of the "seat belt defense." Although
courts at times have been reluctant to accept the latter, they may be under
increasing pressure to adopt the former. Based on the result reached by the
Holland court and the above-posited legal justifications for the theories
upon which the "helmet defense" can be asserted, defense counsel has
ample ammunition in representing a negligent motorist such as D in the
hypothetical. Although helmetless cyclists may be easy riders, they must
face the hard facts that in bringing personal injury suits, they may not
recover for injuries that could have been avoided or reduced by their
simply wearing helmets.
Finally, the tone of this article is obviously directed to defense
attorneys seeking to establish the "helmet defense" in judicial forums;
however, the same messages should be equally clear to the states'
legislatures. If the courts are hesitant in allowing the "helmet defense," the
legislatures, who are not bound by common law, should acknowledge the
equitable application and results of the "helmet defense" and follow the
lead of the Minnesota legislature in enacting some form of damage
apportionment for civil actions of this type. Perhaps, in those twenty state
legislatures in which helmet laws remain under attack by the "freedom of
choice" advocates, a trade-off can be made by repealing the statutes while
enacting provisions similar to those of the Minnesota statute.180 In any
event, it is hoped that defense attorneys and defendants will not have to
rely on changes from the state legislatures-those changes should certainly
be forthcoming from the courts.18'
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